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Abstract
SSA's Development Delay: Three Essays on The Monetary System, The International
Trade and Property Rights
Julie Lohi
This dissertation focuses on the issues of economic performances in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA). It includes three essays on the monetary system, the international trade and
property rights.
The first chapter discusses the inflation dynamics across different exchange rate
regime groups in SSA. In particular, a comparative analysis is conducted between the
CFA franc currency union countries and the non-members of SSA to see whether the
CFA franc countries exhibit lower inflation in the short and the long run compared to
other countries. This chapter also assesses the money supply growth, output growth and
money velocity growth as the sources of inflation in the region. The empirical results
support the inflation- growth trade-off in the CFA zones. While the CFA countries
experience relatively lower inflation in the short and the long run, they suffer from a
pronounced output loss relative to all other non -CFA countries in general and relative
to the pegged non-CFA countries in particular.
The second chapter analyses the implications of the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theory
of factor abundance and the increasing return to scale (IRS) theory of product differentiation in the bilateral trade within SSA. It shows that the similarity of the factors
of production proportions and the lack of product differentiation reduce the extent of
trade between African countries. Trade policies that are aimed to promote trade within
the region (i.e., FTA, custom unions) are likely to fail because SSA countries produce
similar homogeneous products. The key factor for economic success from international
trade for the SSA region relies on how to manufacture products in different varieties
and how to export their comparative advantage goods outside the region.
The last chapter identifies the effects of property rights on the total factor productivity (TFP) across different property rights levels and income groups in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA). I subdivide SSA countries by their property rights score and by their
income levels. Then, I estimate a model in which TFP depends on human capital and
institutional qualities. The results mainly show that private property rights have a
positive and statistically significant effect on the TFP in SSA. This result indicates
that private property rights are important determinants in the process of economic
development. If well-defined and enforced by state laws, private property rights will
contribute to growth in SSA.
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Chapter 1
Exchange Rate Regimes and
Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa
1.1

Introduction

The impact of exchange rate regime (ERR) on economic performance is one of the
hotly debated issues in the field of international finance. This correlation gained more
importance in the face of financial crises as international capital flows become increasingly unstable. The critical role of ERR in economic performance in our globalizing
world has induced many countries in recent years to switch from one regime to another. If, following the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the choice of an ERR was
important for stabilization outcomes, then, nowadays the choice of ERR may have important policy implications - particularly, for policy aimed at tackling external shocks
and speculative attacks (Eichengreen, 2008).
Across the globe, different types of ERR ranging from hard peg to free floating
regimes exist. There is no consensus on which type of regime better enhances economic performance. Alternative ERR have some strengths and weaknesses regarding
economic outcomes in the country when they are at work. There are some arguments in
favor of and against each type of the ERR. For instance, Mundell (1963) and Fleming
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(1962) argue that under a fixed ERR, trade and investment are more certain. The trade
and investment advantages of the fixed ERR stem from the reduction of transaction
costs and lower inflation expectations. These advantages are what led the European
Economic Community (EEC) to adopt the fixed ERR to achieve their single market
program. The lower inflation associated with the fixed ERR has been an important
incentive that enticed Great Britain to return to the gold standard in 1925 after abandoning it in the wake of world war I in 1914 (Capie, Mills and Wood, 1986a). By fixing
a currency to a foreign anchor, the domestic country imports the monetary policy of
the anchor country. Such import is associated with political commitment and disciplinary monetary policy (i.e., alignment to the anchor country's monetary policies) for
anti-inflationary outcomes. However, the fixed ERR is criticized for poorly insulating
the economy against external shocks (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995).
Supporters of the flexible ERR argue that it confers more independence of
monetary policy through the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate. By changing the
nominal exchange rate, the country gains control over the impact of disruptive economic
shocks. Friedman (1953) pointed out that the speed at which a country adjusts relative
prices when hit by a real shock depends on the ERR at work in that country.
Friedman (1953) argues that in a world of sticky prices, the flexible ERR absorbs the effects of external shocks more effectively than the fixed ERR. Indeed, under
a flexible regime, in the presence. of shocks, the nominal exchange rate adjusts innnediately, allowing relative prices to change. This mechanism reduces the effects of shocks
on macro variables, especially on output. Previous empirical work has found support
for Friedman's hypothesis. For example, Broda (2004) tests Friedman's hypothesis on
the terms of trade shocks and finds that the response of real GDP to a terms of trade
shock is much smaller under a flexible regime than under a fixed regime. Broda notes
that in response to a 10 percent negative shock to the terms of trade, the real exchange
rate depreciated faster under the floating system while the depreciation was slower in
the pegged regime. As a result, real GDP fell by 1.9 percent under fixed regime and
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only by 0.2 percent in the flexible exchange rate regime.
The advantage of the floating ERR is that it insulates the economy from external shocks and eventual speculative attacks. However, floating regimes are expected to
exhibit high volatility in exchange rates and high inflation. Mussa (1986) underlined
that real exchange rates fluctuate a lot more in the short run in countries with flexible
ERR than in countries with fixed ERR. This is so because nominal exchange rates are
very volatile under flexible regimes. Similarly, Shambaugh (2004), Klein (2005), and
Klein and Shambaugh (2008) show that exchange rates are more volatile under a floating ERR than under a fixed ERR. Specifically, Klein and Shambaugh (2008) find that
in magnitude, pegged (fixed) ERR have about 16 percent less volatility in the nominal

exchange rate than a floating ERR. After classifying counties by the de facto behavior
of the country's monetary authorities, Levy et al. (2001) show that a flexible ERR
exhibits higher exchange rate volatility with lower volatility in international reserves
while the opposite holds under a pegged ERR.
Whether in the aftermath one type of ERR outperforms the others in terms
of the economic outcome, ERRs are crucial determinants of economic performance.
Rose (2011) states that "the exchange rate is an important asset price, perhaps the

most import asset price". This implies that the regime monitoring the exchange rates
is important to assets' prices and therefore economic outcomes. An ERR can impact
the economy through different macroeconomic channels. For instance, the flexible ERR
can expose the econoniy through the inflationary channel; the fixed regime by retarding
the adjustment of prices in the face of external shocks allows large fluctuations in
output. Inflation expectations can lead to higher or lower interest rates in the country
and thereby affect trade and investment incentives. In short, an ERR is a crucial
determinant of economic outcomes.
Despite the prominent connection between ERR and economic performance,
little work exist in the empirical literature that addresses how the type of ERR implemented is retarding the economic take-off of some developing countries. This paper
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attempts to fill this gap for some Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries which are still
lagging economically. Specifically, this paper focuses on the inflation dynamics between
two groups of countries with different types of ERR in SSA: the CFA franc currency
unions with a pegged ERR and the Non-CFA SSA countries with a non-fixed

1

ERR.

Two important facts explain the choice of the country sample. First, the countries of
the CFA currency unions2 have been using a common currency - the CFA franc with a
conventional peg even before their independence from the French and up to date. The
CFA franc had been pegged to the French Franc since December 26th 1945 - the date
of its creation and it has been pegged to the Euro since January 1999. From this fact,
it is hard to identify how these countries would have performed economically under an
alternative ERR.
The main feature of the CFA franc.currency is the guarantee of its parity and
convertibility by the treasury since the creation of this currency. This convertibility is
achieved and maintained by the central banks with the French Treasury through the
mechanism of an operations account. The convertibility of the CFA franc by the French
Treasury has some political and economic incentives. Politically, this allows the French
authorities to remain implicated and influence the monetary decisions of their former
colonies. The CFA franc remains the emblem of colonization and a powerful channel of
France's imperialism over its "former" colonies. Under the economics point of view, the
convertibility of the CFA franc benefits most to France. The guarantee of the convertibility based on colonial financial arrangements advantages French multinational firms
who invest in Africa and transfer the funds to France by reducing transaction costs.
Most importantly, since the monetary decisions are made upon France's agreement,
1 Different

types of ERR exist within the non-CFA sample, ranging from a managed ERR to a

floating ERR.
2 The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) - The countries of WAEMU are:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire, Guinea-Bissau Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. But Guinea-Bissau
is not included in the analysis as it joined the union only in 1998, and the Central African Monetary
and Economic Community (CAMEC) - The countries of CAMEC are: Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
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these decisions are made in favor of the French companies (see IMF 1969).
Since its creation, the CFA franc has been devaluated only once. A 50 percent
devaluation of the CFA franc in foreign currency occurred on January 13, 1994. The
1994 devaluation explains the high inflation peak of the CFA zones in the Appendix
Figure 1. Between 1990 and 1993, the CFA franc turned out to be overvalued. During
this period, the member countries faced severe fiscal imbalances accompanied by rapid
growth of the external debt. Moreover, the CFA franc countries have been also subject
to adverse terms of trade movements. The devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 was
intended to alleviate the macroeconomic issues. Though, this peak does not influence
the empirical results.
Secondly, SSA countries exhibit many commonalities in terms of their history
and economic characteristics (market access issues, dependence on the export of few
primary commodities, financial markets development, geography, level of industrialization, government efficiency, etc.). Therefore, it is appropriate to compare the economic
performances of the CFA countries to that of the non-CFA SSA countries with alternative ERR. Discussing the correlation between. economic outcomes and ERR for the
CFA countries and distinguishing between the CFA and non-CFA countries of SSA can
provide important policy prescriptions - for both exchange rate regime and monetary
policy reforms - to aid in solving the countries' growth delay. This paper focuses on
inflation dynamics across the two samples because a key purpose of participating in a
currency union is to benefit from lower inflation.
The goal carried out in this paper is so far an uncovered topic, especially
distinguishing between the CFA and Non-CFA countries of SSA countries on inflation
dynamics. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 states the
stylized facts about the fixed and flexible ERR. Section 3 describes exchange rate
regimes in general and provides the classification of SSA countries by exchange rate
regime and by monetary policy framework. Section 4 describes the data, presents the
models, and states the hypothesis. The results and their interpretations are in section
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5. Section 6 concludes the paper. Regression tables and figures are stored in separate
sections.

1.2

The Stylized Facts about Fixed and Flexible
Exchange Rate Regimes

Across the literature there are three key stylized facts about the ERR. The first
is the inconsistency between the de facto and the de jure ERR (i.e., countries that
officially claim to float heavily intervene in the exchange market to regulate the rate
of exchange of their currencies). The second is that many countries have shifted to a
flexible ERR since the demise of the Bretton Wood System. The third fact is what
Eichengreen (1994) named the "hollowing-out hypothesis" and Fischer (2001) refers to
as a "bipolar view". The "hollowing-out hypothesis" or the "bipolar view" stipulates
that intermediate regimes including conventional pegs are incompatible with capital
flows. Only the two extremes: hard peg or free floating are sustainable in the face
of high capital flows. Some recent facts across the world support the vulnerability of
the pegs in the face of capital mobility. More or less, countries involved in crises in
the 1990s were associated with the fixed (pegged) ERR. The 1994 Tequila crisis of
Mexico, the 1998 exchange rate crises of Russia and Brazil, and those of Turkey and
Argentina in 2000, are a few examples. Fischer (2001) mentions that in contrast to the
emerging countries with pegged currencies who experienced the exchange rate crisis,
other emerging countries with more flexible rates (South Africa, Israel) avoided crises
of this type. The implication of this third fact is that fixed ERR's are less efficient in
insulating economies from external shocks.
With a fixed ERR the country sacrifices its ability to stabilize the economy
against attacks in return for credibility gains through commitments (Klein and Shambaugh, 2010). Under a fixed ERR, the slow responsiveness of the nominal exchange
rate to adjust relative prices in the face of external shocks allows disturbances in real
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GDP (e.g., Friedman, 1953; Levy eta!., 2001; Caballero, 2002; Broda, 2004, Edwards
and Yeyati, 2005). Therefore, fixed regimes would exhibit more loss in their per capita
outputs while the reverse is expected for floating regimes. Nevertheless, for the fixed
ERR, the loss in output is expected to be compensated by lower inflation through credibility and disciplinary monetary policies associated to the commitment of pegging the
domestic currency to a foreign currency that plays the role of an anchor.

Nate that pegging a currency is associated with various political commitments
which allow importing the anchor country's monetary policies (disciplinary monetary
policy), reduce inflationary policies, increase the credibility of the domestic monetary
authorities, reduce inflation expectations and stabilize the economy. The high political
cost of fixing the exchange rate is what forces policy makers to adopt certain monetary
and fiscal policies to avoid the demise of the regime. This constraint confers credibility
and discipline to the fixed ERR (e.g., Meltzer, 1986; Ghosh eta!. 1997; Yagci, 2001;
Levy et al., 2001). On the other hand, under a flexible ERR the management of the
nominal exchange rate to facilitate the quick adjustment of relative prices is associated
with higher inflation expectations. In fact, the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate
makes the relative price less predictable.
The correlation between inflation and the exchange rate regime is well described
in the literature. The investigation of inflation persistence shows three main findings:
1) inflation rates vary over time and across countries due to the monetary policy framework; 2) the speed of this variation differs over time; 3) there is an inflation-output
trade off associated with inflation adjustment (see Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Sargent,
2001; Cecchetti and Debelle, 2006). Although not all papers directly relate inflation to
the ERR, three main models are used in the literature to study inflation: the flexible
and sticky price models and the sticky information model. The flexible price model
argues that inflation evolves over time due to the monetary authorities' action of adjusting monetary policy very frequently. The expansionary policy of the policymakers
leads to inflationary outcomes (Barra and Gordon, 1983). The pioneers of the sticky
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price model use the wage contract in explaining inflation (Taylor, 1979; Calvo, 1983).
However, the sticky price model falls short in explaining inflation after introducing the
real wage (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995). Lastly, the sticky information model developed
by Mankiw and Reis (2002) shows that, rather than sticky wages, prices adjust slowly
because the cost of information prevents economic agents from frequently updating
prices according to current macroeconomic conditions. The flexible price model has
some incarnation of the ERR. In fact, the frequent price adjustment of the monetary
authorities reflects the flexibility of the nominal exchange which is the foundation for
the flexible exchange rate. Conclusively, a flexible exchange rate is associated with
higher inflation.
Recently, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) described inflation dynamic in the contest
of exchange rate regimes. The theoretical framework developed by the authors focused
on the cost and benefits of the fixed exchange rate regime. According to Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995), there are three main reason why countries fix (peg) their currency's
foreign value. The first reason is to avoid exchange rate volatility like the one under the
floating ERR. Exchange rate volatility creates uncertainty about future assets' prices
and reduces trade and investment (see also Mundell, 1963; Fleming, 1962). The second
reason is to import the anchor country's inflation rate. Fixing the domestic currency
to a foreign one with lower inflation allows the domestic country to experience lower
inflation due to the credibility by committing to disciplinary policies. The third reason,
closely related to the second is the disinflationary objective. Some countries adopt the
fixed ERR after they have experienced higher degrees of inflation. Fixing (pegging)
the currency in this case becomes an objective solution to reducing inflation. Among
all, the main purpose and the theoretical benefit of fixing a currency's foreign value is
to have price volatility under control.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) also point on one inconvenience of fixing the exchange rate: the forgone control over domestic money supply that would have been
used for stabilization purposes. Theoretically and practically, in the face of external
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shocks such as the drop in demand for exports goods, the country would adjust import
and export prices by depreciating the real exchange rate. That is the monetary authorities can reduce the domestic interest rate. The reduction of the home interest rate
puts demand pressure on foreign assets with a relatively higher interest rate. Therefore,
the domestic currency depreciates and stimulates the short run demand for domestic
goods. If quick, this adjustment reduces the impacts of the shock. But, if prices and
nominal exchaJJge rates are rigid in the short run like under the fixed exchange rate
regime, firms will have to hire less or fire some workers to reduce output in the face
of the lower demand for their products. In this situation, as the domestic interest rate
.is determined by the foreign rate, the domestic monetary authorities have no power
to change it. Thus, domestic attempts to change the money supply have no effects.
Indeed, under the fixed exchange rate, the money supply is out of the control of the
monetary authorities.
Given these stylized facts aJJd the theoretical frameworks about flexible and
fixed exchange rate regimes, this paper tests whether the CFA franc currency union
countries- whose common currency is pegged to a foreign anchor experience lower inflation rates in the short and long run compared to the others, the non-CFA countries
of SSA as their benefit for scarifying output in the face of shocks.

1.3

Exchange Rate Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa

The official classification of countries by their exchange rate regime (ERR) has
been traditionally provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But Calvo and
Reinhart (2000) show how some countries that officially claim to have a floating regime
intervene in the foreign exchange market. The mismatch between the de jure and the de
facto classifications of countries has led economists in the field of international finance
to make a clear distinction and reclassify countries based on their de facto regimes.
The most known alternative classifications of countries based on the de facto approach
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are those of Levy et al. (2000a, 2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Shambaugh (2004),
and Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Each of them uses different methodologies. 3
However, the classifications of SSA countries from any of the above cited classification
sources match those of the IMF. For this reason, the recent IMF's de facto classification
of countries provided in the AREAER4 is used in this paper.
The IMF's annual report on exchange rate arrangement and monetary policy
frameworks classifies exchange rate arrangements based on the degree to which the
exchange rate is determined by the market. Ten key types of ERR are listed from across
the world. (1) No separate legal tender (hard pegs), (2) currency board regimes (hard
peg), (3) conventional peg 5 (soft peg). (4) Crawling pegs, (5) crawl-like arrangements,
(6) pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands6 ; (7) Stabilized arrangements, (8)
other managed arrangement7 regimes, (9) floating and (10) free floating 8 exchange rate
regimes employ monetary aggregate target and inflation targeting as their monetary
policy frameworks.
All of the above types of ERR associated with different monetary policy frameworks are at work in different countries in SSA. WAEMU and CEMAC that make up
the two CFA franc zones, use the conventional peg as their exchange rate regime. The
3 The techniques of Levy et al.,(2003) are based on the exchange rate and international reserves.
Shambaugh employs the band of exchange rate fluctuation. The author classifies an ERR as peg if the
exchange rate fluctuates within a narrow band over a long period and non-peg otherwise. Reinhart
and co-authors use the variations in the market rates of exchange.
4 Annual Report- on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
5 The peg regimes use an exchange rate anchor as the monetary policy framework. Under the
exchange rate anchor, the monetary authority buys or sells foreign exchange to maintain domestic
currency's rate of exchange at the targeted rate or within a range. The exchange rate represents the
nominal anchor or intermediate target to monetary policy for these regimes (see IMF's AREAER,
2010.
6 Pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands also use the exchange rage anchor framework.
7 Managed arrangement regimes use exchange rate anchor, monetary aggregate target and inflation
targeting as monetary policy frameworks. Under the monetary aggregate framework the targeted
aggregate serves as the anchor to monetary policy. For inflation targeting framework, monetary policy
decision depends on inflation forecasting and how the forecasted inflation deviates from the targeted
one. Thus inflation forecast is the nominal anchor to monetary policy.
8 Floating and free floating regimes employ monetary aggregate target and inflation targeting as
their monetary policy frameworks.
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CFA franc of CEMAC and that of WAEMU have the same rate of exchange to the euro
to which they are pegged. The monetary policy framework at work in the CFA zones
is the exchange rate anchor. Eritrea, Cape Verde, Comoros, Sao Tome and Principles,
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland also use the conventional peg as their exchange rate
regime. The difference between the CFA franc zones and these countries is that the
zones form a currency union (the CFA franc zone countries are linked to one central
bank in each zone and use a common currency: the CFA franc) while the other countries have their own central banks. Zimbabwe uses the no-separate-legal-tender regime
and is pegged to the U.S. dollar.
Burundi and Rwanda use a stabilized arrangement ERR with a monetary aggregate target as their monetary policy framework. Botswana has the crawling peg regime
with the currency compositely pegged. Ethiopia is pegged to the U.S. dollar under the
crawl-like-arrangement exchange rate regime. Angola, Liberia, Guinea, Malawi, and
Nigeria exhibit other managed arrangement regimes. Angola and Liberia are pegged to
the U.S. dollar with an exchange rate anchor while Guinea, Malawi, and Nigeria use a
monetary aggregate target framework. Twelve SSA countries operate under the floating exchange rate regime. Ten9 of these target a monetary aggregate while the other
two - Ghana and South Africa, have inflation targeting as their monetary policy framework. Mauritius is the only SSA country where a free floating exchange rate regime is
at work. In this paper the SSA countries will be grouped as CFA and non-CFA zones,
where the non-CFA zone combines pegged, floating and some intermediate ERR's.
9

Congo, Dem. Rep., Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
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The Model and Data Description
Data Description

The data on all variables used in this investigation are retrieved from the World
Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The variables employed include: Consumer price index inflation: (CPI), money supply (M2), real GDP, population, the terms of trade (computed as the ratio of exports to imports prices), and the
trade openness (calculated as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP). The
data covers a panel of 36 SSA countries over the period from 1980 to 2007. Countries
included in the examination are those with valid data on all variables of interest over
the entire period. Countries with hyperinflation (inflation rate exceeding 50 percent
and persistent over many years during the examination period) are excluded. Countries
like Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola are not included for
both reasons, the hyperinflation issue and the lack of data. Guinea Bissau, a current
member of WAEMU is excluded from the analysis because it joined the union in 1998.
So, this country has been a member for less than 20 years according to the data period.
Benin and many other countries were not included for lack of data on key variables
over many years.

1.4.2

The Models

Studies of inflation have frequently used augmented Phillips curve models in which
the policy preferences of the natural rate of unemployment and the expected supply of
expansionary policy are incorporated. Although these models well suit inflation persistence, there is no reliable record on employment for many SSA countries; making
it difficult to use such models to empirically test inflation in SSA. Other models have
been used to examine the inflation effects of exchange rate regimes in many developing
countries. For instance, Levy and Sturzenegger (2001) developed an inflation model in
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which inflation is related to the changes in money supply growth, the change in GDP
growth, the real interest rate and the change in money velocity. However, their model
appears as an identity 10 and thus, it gives less opportunity to conduct the comparative
analysis on inflation across the SSA countries. Kamin (1997) studies the linkage between inflation and the ERR for Asian, industrialized and Latin American countries.
But the model does not distingush between the short and the long run. I explain
Kamin's model in Appendix III.
To capture the short and the long run inflation differences between my subsamples while avoiding estimating an identity model, I construct a model where inflation
depends on trade openness, 11 external shocks (terms-of-trade) and the lagged inflation.
In this model, I add the dummies for exchange rate regime groups in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) (Equation 1). The terms-of-trade shocks and the trade openness are
important to be controlled for in the model, because they are potential inflationary
channels. The reason for the inclusion of the lagged inflation is that there can be
some serial correlation between current and past inflation (the inertia problem). The
augmentation with the CFA dummy allows identification of whether the fixed ERR
succeeds in maintaining lower inflation against the flexible regime in the short and the
long runs as a result of enhanced credibility and disciplined monetary policies.

(1.1)
where,

Kit

is inflation rate in country i at time t. CF A;, Open,,, TT;, and

1f;t-l

represent respectively the dummy for the CFA zone, trade openness, terms of trade,
and lagged inflation. The CFA dummy takes the value of 1 if country i belongs to the
CFA franc currency union or zero otherwise.
For the short run, I estimate equation (1) on the full sample (sample S1 comprising

+

1rit ~ f!o
f!,Ll.(M2it)- fJ2Ll.(RGDPit)
11 Trade openness is denoted "open" and

10

to GDP.

+ {!3!,, + fi•Ll.(vit)
calculated as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports
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CFA and all non-CFA countries), the first reduced sample (the 82- sample without
pegging non-CFA countries), the second reduced sample (the 83- sample with only the
CFA and floating ERR non-CFA countries), and the third reduced sample (the 84sample with only the CFA and pegged ERR non-CFA countries) using pooled OL8
and fixed effects estimation. For the long run inflation regression, the average inflation

(1r,) over the data period is estimated based on the CFA dummy (Equation 2). By
the theory, if the CFA countries have lower inflation relative to the other countries, it
would be a result of a lower money growth. To examine the extent of money supply
growth in the CFA zones relative to other 8SA countries, I estimate equation (3) below.
equation {3) is similar to equation (2). However,. the average growth ofmoney supply

(grawthM2,) is used as the dependent variable in Equation, 3.

"' = {30 + f3,CF A;+ c,

GrowthM2,- {30

1.4.3

+ f31CFA, + c,.

(1.2)

(1.3)

The Testable Hypothesis

From the theory, the testable hypothesis is that, if a fixed exchange rate regime
provides lower inflation, the CFA franc must have lower inflation in both the short
and the long run compared to the non-fixed exchange rate regime countries. Thus in
equation (1), one would expect {34 to be negative and statistically significant, and in
equation (2), {31 to be negative and statistically significant. The negative signs of these
coefficients would imply that the CFA franc countries exhibit lower inflation relative
to the non-CFA countries. Theoretically, there is no incentive to increase the money
supply in an attempt to lower the nominal interest rate under a fixed exchange rate
regime. Under a fixed ERR, inflation can be reduced by maintaining lower money
supply growth. From this point of view, we would expect {31 in equation (3) to be

Chapter 1. Exchange Rate Regimes and Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa

15

negative and statistically significant. In addition, if the main source of lowering inflation
is the extent of money suppy growth, then the magnitude of /31 in equation (3) would
match the size of

/31 in equation (2). However, if there is any mismatch between /31

of equation (2) and that of equation (3), then other sources might be influencing the
inflation rates. These sources could be the extent of the growth of the real GDP per
capita and/ or the growth of money velocity.
The see how the growth of the real GDP per capita and money velocity influence
inflation in the CFA zones, I estimate equation 3.1 and 3.2 below.

RGDPjcap;

= {30 + {31CFA; + E;

(1.4)

(1.5)
where, RGDP/cap; and

1.1;

are respectively, the average of the growth of real GDP

per capita and that of the growth of money velocity over the data period. C FA;
is the CFA dummy. Theoretically, we would expect a negative correlation between
inflation and money velocity growth. Also, a higher growth of output would contribute
in lowering inflation. If there is a mismacth between the sizes of
3, then the coefficient restriction on

/31 in equation 2 and

/31 in equation 3.1 and 3.2 will depend on the type

of the mismatch.
Case 1: If the size of

/31 in equation (3) is larger than that of /31 in equation

(2) in absolute value, this would imply that the extent of the RGDP per capita is
rather resisting to the reduction of inflation. This resistance will be reflected in a
negative coefficient of

/31 in equation (3.1). Nevertheless, a negative /31 in equation

(3.1) would meant the CFA countries face a loss in their output per capita. Which
loss could be detrimental to welfare. In addition, if the sum of /31 in equation (3) and

/31 in equation (3.1) still mismatches the size of /31 in equation (2), then the growth
of the money velocity should have some influences on the inflation rates. In the case
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in equation (3) and in equation (3.1) is larger in absolute value

than the magnitude of {31 in equation (2), there must be a positive growth of money
velocity in the CFA zones relative to that in other non-CFA countries. The underlying
implication of a positive growth of the money supply velocity is a higher real interest
rate. In fact, higher real interst rate induces banks and consumers to avoid keeping
money. Thus, higher interest rates reduce money demand and allow faster circulation
of money - higher growth of money velocity.
Money velocity growth is theoretically influenced by the nominal interest rate.
If the CFA countries exhibit higher growth of money velocity, this would imply that

these countries face .higher nominal interest rate. However, the difference between the
nominal interest rate and the real interest rate is the rate of inflation (real interest rate
=nominal interest rate- inflation). So, if these countries face higher growth of money
velocity, implying higher nominal interest rate, they should be enduring also higher
real interest rates. This is so because, as inflation rates are lower in these zones, there
should not be a large difference between the nominal and the real interest rates. In
either case, higher interest rates (implying higher growth of money velocity) and/or
output loss would decay the economic performance of the CFA countries. The reason
is, real interest rates are the cost of borrowing. So, facing higher interest rates can
reduce investment per capita and output. Moreover, the welfare of individuals depends
on how much goods and services they can consume. Hence, output loss directly reduces
people's welfare.
Case 2: If the size of /31 in equation (3) is smaller than that of /31 in equation (2)
in absolute value, we would expect the reverse senario from case 1. Note also that for
the comparisons between the CFA and the pegged non-CFA (samples 84), if the CFA
countries perform better, this would be the currency union effect as both parties in the
sample have the pegged ERR. the only difference is the the CFA zones are currency
unions while each country of the pegged non-CFA group has its own central bank.
I estimate equations 2, 3, 3.1, and 3.2 by OLS and the robust regression for
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S1, S2, S3, and S4. The robust regression methodology allows controlling for the
heteroscedasticity to avoid biased parameter estimates. I report the results of the long
run estimations (equations, 2, 3, 3.1, and 3.2) All tables are stored in the Table section.

1.5

Results and Interpretation

The focus on Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) and the distinction between CFA and nonCPA countries in this examination reveals important information on the exchange rate
regimes (ERR)' influences on economic performances across SSA countries. Tables 1,
2, 3, and 4 provide respectively the long run inflation, money growth, output per capita
growth, and money velocity growth in the CFA countries relatively to: 1) all other nonCPA countries, 2) non-CFA-non-pegged ERR countries, 3) the non-CFA with floating
regimes, and the non-CFA pegging ERR countries. The OLS estimation of the long run
inflation shows that the CFA countries have respectively 11 percent, 13 percent, 16,
and 3 percent less inflation relative to all other non-CFA, the non-CFA-non pegged, the
non-CPA-floating countries, and the non-CFA pegged ERR countries (all the results
are statistically significant at a 99 percent level of confidence).
The seemingly higher inflation of the non-CFA before the robust regression is
due to a few countries in this sub-sample. Actually, at different occasions over the
data period, there have been temporary hyperinflations in some non-CFA countries.
However, after the peaks, the countries quickly recovered and inflation rate become as
usual. For instance, in the early 1990s, Zambia experienced an occasional hyperinflation
mounting up to 183 percent. But after this period, the inflation rate declined back to its
common rate around 25 percent. Similarly, Uganda experienced some brief, but severe
hyperinflation in the late 1980s; Ghana was subject to an inflation of 122 percent in
1983. In 1995, the inflation in Nigeria reached 72 percent; Uganda had its highest
inflation (56 percent) in 1986 and Mozambique's inflation peak of 63 percent occurred
in 1994. None of these countries has a peg regime. Rather, they are all floating regime

Chapter 1. Exchange Rate Regimes and Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa

18

countries; that is why there is no big difference between the long run results of the
sample 82 (using non-CFA without the pegs) and that of the sample 83 (using the
non-CFA floating regimes only).
The occasional inflation peaks highlighted above do not reflect the usual average inflation rate of these non-CFA floating regime countries. The peaks create the
heteroscedasticity (outliers) problem in the data. The presence of heteroscedasticity
seems to be pumping up inflation rates of the non-CFA countries as a whole and making as if the CFA countries have relatively very low inflation rates in the long run. The
classical estimation methods such as the ordinary least square (018) are outlier sensitive. Therefore, the presence of outliers causes the 018 estimation to be inefficient;
leading to inflated and bias estimates of the residuals (Mia et al., 2008). To correct
for this mitigation, I use the robust regression methodology. The robust regression
is the estimation methodology that aims to control for heteroscedasticity in the data
to avoid biased parameter estimates. There is an extensive literature on how outliers
occur and how to limit their effects on the parameter estimates. Across literature, the
most used method to correct for heteroscedasticity in the data is the robust estimation
methodology (see Fellner, 1986).
After accounting for heteroscadasticity in the model, the inflation rates of the
CFA countries turn out to be in average 5 percent less than that of other country
samples, and 0.4 percent less than that of ·other pegged regimes non-CFA countries.
Even though not too large, the CFA countries exhibit lower inflation relative to their
88A counterparty as a result of having a fixed ERR. Moreover, being in a currency
union pays off in terms of containing inflation as the CFA countries have slightly lower
inflation compared to the other pegged non-CFA countries. Basically, there is a lower
inflation benefit for the CFA countries from having a fixed ERR and being a currency
union.

This lower inflation is obtained in the CFA zones by maintaining lower money
growth. As shown in the results of the robust regression for money growth, the CFA
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countries have respectively 8 percent, 9 percent, 11 percent, and -7 percent less growth
in their money supply relative to all other non-CPA, the non-CPA-non-pegged, the nonCPA-floating, and the pegged non-CPA countries. The CPA countries have a restraint
growth of money. However, the comparison of the extent of the growth of money in the
CPA countries to their lower inflation level reveals a mismatch. The CPA countries do
not have as much lower inflation as they would in accordance to their restraint money
growth. Across each sub-sample, the magnitude of the negative money growth is larger
than that of inflation (-7.6 percent versus -4.7 percent in S1; -9.5 percent versus -5
percent in S2; -11 percent versus -7 percent in S3; and -7 percent versus -0.4 percent
in S4).
This mismatch is due to two phenomena within the CPA zones. The first
fact is the apparent negative effects of the fixed ERR on output per capita growth
and the second is the higher growth of money velocity within the CPA zones. As
underlined in the hypothesis section, a higher growth of output would contribute to
lowering inflation. However, the CPA countries exhibit negative output per capita
growth relative to the non-CPA states. The negative coefficient of the RGDP per
capita growth across the three sub-samples indicates that fixed ERR hurts the CPA
countries by reducing their extent of output growth. In addition, the CPA zones having
less output growth compared to the pegged non-CPA implies that the CPA countries
are disadvantaged by being locked in a currency union. Consequently, the negative
effect of output growth diminishes the effects of money growth on inflation. Across
the three first sub-samples, about 1 percent of the lower money growth compensates
for output loss. In the last sub-sample (S4), 2 percent of the lower money growth is
employed to compensate for the output loss.
On the other hand, the CPA countries have a higher growth of money velocity
relative to the non-CPA states. The result of S4 shows that the CPA countries have a
lower money velocity growth compared to the pegged non-CPA. However, the difference
is not statistically significant. This positive velocity growth constitutes another con-
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tracting factor to the effects of money growth in reducing inflation. The CFA countries
have respectively 1.6 percent, 2 percent, and 1 percent higher growth of money velocity
relative to all the non-CFA, the non-CFA-non-pegged, and the non-CFA-floating countries. So, the impact of the restrained money growth on inflation in the CFA countries
is reduced respectively by these amounts of money velocity growths across the subsamples. The higher growth of the money velocity in the CFA zones might mainly
stem from the higher interest rates in these countries. After subtracting the sizes of
the coefficients of output per capita growth and the money velocity growth from the
coefficient of money growth, the difference is about the magnitude of the lower inflation in the CFA countries (for 81, 82, and 83), but the mismatch persists in 84. the
difference in money growth between the CFA zones and the pegged non-CFA is large
(7 percent at a 99 percent level of coniiderice), but the difference in terms of inflation
between the two groups is relatively small (0.4 percent).
The sub-sample 84 reveals that the pegged non-CFA countries have the ability
to achieve lower inflation (closely as much as in the CFA countries), maitain similar
rates of money velocity growth, and have a higher growth of their output per capita
relative to the CFA countries. As the size of the output loss in the CFA surpasse their
extent of lower inflation relative to the other pegged non-CFA, being a member of the
CFA currency union must be economically disruptive. Gurtner (1999) warns that the
CFA zones do not meet the required conditions for an optimum curency area (OCA).
According to Gurtner (1999), the CFA countries follow different supply cycles. Thus,
they face growth barriers at different points of time. The paths of the GDPs of the
CFA countries depends on the fluctuation of the prices of the primary commodities
that underline the economies of these countries. Moreover, there is no intensive trade
within the zones to necessitate the reduction of transaction cost by using a common
currency. In addition labor mobility across countries within the zones is not intense
(only the labor mobility in the informal sector sems to be fulfilled according to Gurtner,
1999). As the CFA union countries do not meet the requirements of the OCA, it is
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not surprising that locking countries with such heterogenuous cyclical patterns under
a common currency is undermining their economic performances. The reason of the
pronounced difference between the CFA and the other pegged non-CFA in economic
performance is the difference in interest rates between the two groups. As shown in
Figure 4 of Appendix II, the pegged non-CFA have more investment per capita relative
to the CFA zones. This higher investment per capita could be a result of a lower cost
of borrowing (lower interest rates).
In general, the difference in inflation between the CFA and non-CFA countries
is decreasing while the gap in investment per capita between them is enlarging (see

Figure 1 of Appendix II versus Figure 4 of Appendix II). The inflation gap between the
CFA and the non-CFA is decreasing over time. The inflation rates of the CFA countries
are increasing while that of the non-CFA is diminishing on average. This convergence
is due to the fact that output is growing faster in the non-CFA zone and slower in the
CFA zones.
The inflation-growth trade-off is a major question in the discussion of the economic performance of developing countries like the CFA states. Is it worth sacrificing
output for "lower" inflation? The lower extent of output in the CFA zones is a result
of different macroeconomic problem which slow economic activities. In fact, having
higher nominal interest rates, the CFA countries experience higher real interest rate
which is the cost of borrowing. As shown in Figure 2, the real interest rate has been
high and more volatile in the CFA countries than that in the non-CFA states. As real
interest rate reflects the cost of capital in the production process, facing high real interest rate can limit investments, the extents of output and the economic growth. Figure
4 supports the lower rate of investment under the CFA zones as a result of higher real
interest rates.
The evidence from the hypothetical money model states three main benefits

from keeping lower inflation. The first is the transaction cost reduction. The second is
the reduction of the capital income tax and the third is the reduction of uncertainty.
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However, Aiyagari (1990) studies the benefits and the costs of maintaining lower inflation. The paper mainly shows that the costs of such policy outweighs it benefits.
For instance, the reduction of transaction could be achieved by creating more forms
of money useable in transaction to earn market rates of interest. Moreover, Aiyagari
(1990) argues that reducing money supply in an attempt of keeping lower levels of
inflation might not systematically reduce the variability of inflation. Thus, the impact
of a lowering-inflation policy on welfare could be marginal (Aiyagari, 1990). Therefore,
instead of an inflation lowering policy, which is associated with higher costs, one could
simply implement alternative policies, save in costs and reach the same benefits. In
addition, a study like Hercowitz (1982) show that supply shocks have stronger effects
on relative prices than the changes in money supply (inflation), at least for the US
data.
Since wage contracts are usually not fully indexed to price level variability,
as the real value of money increase due to inflation reduction, the money amount of
the contract is less likely to fully change and compensate for the change in the price
levels. Thus inflation reduction is associated to welfare loss (Okun, 1978; Fischer, 1984).
Fischer (1984) estimates the sacrifice ratio 12 at 6 percent. Okun (1978) and Fischer
(1984) argue that what matters in inlproving welfare is the variability of personal
consumption of goods and services (Aiyagari, 1990). Thus the CFA countries incur
welfare loss through their alignment to a fixed ERR as they experience output loss.
The CFA countries exhibit in average 3 percent less inflation relative to their
counterparties in the short run (these results are significant at 99 percent confidence,
see the pooled panel OLS estimation). The CFA dummy is omitted from the fixed effect
estimation as it is tinle invariant. Basically, like in the long run, the CFA countries
face the inflation-growth trade-off also in the short run. This implies that in the short
run, the member countries of the CFA franc currency unions experience welfare loss
through this trade-off.
12 The

sacrifice ratio is the cost (output loss) incurred in the economy in an attempt to fight inflation.
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Another major finding in this paper is the inflation persistence in the CFA
countries. As shown by the coefficient of the lag inflation in Tables 4, 5, and 6, there
is remarkable inflation inertia in the CFA zones. The magnitude 0. 7 (0.6 for the fixed
effect estimation) of the coefficient of ,.,,_ 1 indicates that 70 (or 60) percent of the
current inflation is due to the past inflation history. The histories of output growth
and money growth have less effect on current inflation compared to the past inflation
itself. This finding on the inflation inertia in the CFA zones endorses Chopra (1985) and
Loungani and Swage! (2001) who showed that inertial components are more influential
in the inflation process in developing countries, especially those with fixed exchange
rate regimes.
In summary, the CFA countries exhibit lower inflation relative to their counterparties. Thus the hypothesis of a lower inflation under a fixed ERR is proven for
the CFA countries. Nevertheless, the Friedman hypothesis that predicts more loss of
output under a fixed ERR relative to a flexible ERR holds also for the sample of the
CFA countries (see estimation results and Figure 3). These two theories indicate that
the inflation-growth trade-off is at work in the CFA zones. However, the goal of an
economic policy in any country is to increase the wellbeing of its citizens. Given the
empirically proven fact that the costs associated to maintaining lower inflation outweigh its benefits on the country's welfare, one can conclude that fixing the foreign
value of their currency is distortive to the CFA countries' economies. Hence, the monetary authorities· of the CFA countries could have use alternative policies to improve
the countries' welfare rather than lowering inflation.

1.6

Conclusion

This paper finds an empirical support for the inflation-growth trade-off associated
with a fixed exchange rate regime (ERR) in the case of the CFA franc currency union
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Despite the relatively lower inflation in the CFA
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countries compared to the non-CFA countries of SSA, the CFA countries experience
output losses through their alignment to a fixed ERR and belonging to a currency
union. As lowering inflation has less impact on welfare than the change in output, this
trade-off is detrimental to the CFA economies. In fact, the economic objective of any
individual is to improve her propensity to consume goods and services. In other words,
economic policies of countries should be oriented to the improvement of their welfare.
The CFA countries, could therefore employ alternative policies to avoid the welfare
loss associated with a fixed ERR, and their alignment to a single currency. The welfare
loss relative to all other non-CFA countries in general and that relative to the pegged
non-CFA countries in particular lead to the conclusion that the CFA countries would
have performed economically better under an alternative ERR, and/ or if they did not
belong to the CFA currency union.
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Regression Tables

Table 1.1: The Long Run Inflation Estimation in Sub-Saharan Africa
82

81

018
Variables
CFA;
ConstaJJ.t
Obs.
R-sq.

Robust

018

84

83
Robust

018

Robust

018

Robust

1ri

1ri

1ri

1ri

1ri

1ri

1ri

1ri

-11.3***
(0.692)
15.5***
(0.4)
1,026
0.21

-4.7***
(0.2)
8.9***
(0.1)
1,026
0.30

-13.3***
(0.7)
17.6***
(0.4)
891
0.30

-5.1 ***
(0.2)
9.4***
(0.1)
891
0.43

-16.3***
(0.8)
20.5***
(0.6)
648
0.40

-6.9***
(0.1)
11.2***
(0.1)
648
0.75

-2.9***
(0.2)
7.1 ***
(0.1)
459
0.34

-0.4***
(0.1)
4.6***
(0.1)
459
0.04

8l1s the CFA versus all other non-CFA, 82 1s the CFA versus the non-CFA-non-pegged ERR,
83 is the CFA versus the non-CFA-floating ERR, and 84 is the CFA versus non-CFA-Pegged ERR.
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 1.2: The Long Run Growth of Money in Sub-Saharan Africa

Variables
CFA,
Constant
Obs.
R-sq.

82
81
83
Robust
018
Robust
018
Robust
018
M2,
M2,
M2,
M2,
M2,
M2,
-10.7*** -7.6*** -12.2*** -9.5*** -16.6*** -10.9***
(0.7)
(0.5)
(0.7)
(0.5)
(0.7)
(0.3)
20.7*** 16.3*** 22.3*** 18.6*** 26.6*** 19.7***
(0.4)
(0.3)
(0.5)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.2)
891
891
648
648
1,053
1,053
0.28
0.45
0.46
0.23
0.32
0.28

84

018
M2,
-5.3***
(0.5)
15.3***
(0.4)
486
0.21

Robust
M2,
-7.1***
(0.3)
15.6***
(0.2)
486
0.6

SliB the CFA versus all other non-CFA, 82 IS the CFA versus the non-CFA-non-pegged ERR,
83 is the CFA versus the non-OFA-floating ERR; and 84 is the CFA versus non-CFA-Pegged ERR.
The dependent variable is the average growth of M2 growth.

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.3: The Long Run Growth of the RGDP per capita in Sub-Saharan
Africa

Variables
CFA,
Constant
Obs.
R-sq.

OL8
Yi
-0.1
(0.4)
4.8***
(0.2)
1,053
0.00

81
Robust
Yi
-1.0***
(0.1)
3.6***
(0.1)
1,053
0.049

OL8
Yi
-0.2
(0.5)
4.9***
(0.3)
891
0.00

82
Robust
Yi
-0.7***
(0.1)
3.3***
(0.1)
891
0.03

OL8
Yi
0.6
(0.4)
4.1 ***
(0.3)
648
0.00

83
Robust
Yi
-1.3***
(0.2)
4.0***
(0.1)
648
0.09

OL8
Yi
0.2
(0.5)
4.5***
(0.4)
486
0.00

84
Robust
Yi
-1.7***
(0.15)
4.3***
(0.12)
486
0.21

Sl IS the CFA versus all other non-CFA, 82 is the CFA versus the non-CFA-non-pegged ERR,
S3 is the CFA versus the non-CFA-floating ERR, and S4 is the CFA versus non-CFA-Pegged ERR.
The dependent variable is the average growth of RGDP per capita.
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 1.4: Long Run Money Velocity Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa
81
Robust
OL8
Variables
CFA,
Constant
.Obs.
R-sq.

v,

v,

3.6***
(0.36)
0.5***
(0.20)
1,026
0.09

1.6***
(0.21)
1.5***
(0.12)
1,026
0.05

OL8

v,

4.3***
(0.40)
-0.1
(0.23)
891
0.12

82
Robust

v,

2.2***
(0.21)
0.9***
(0.13)
891
0.11

83
Robust

OL8
vi

v,

-

1.9***
(0.30)
2.2***
(0.21)
648
0.06

1.3***
(0.21)
1.8***
(0.15)
648
0.06

OL8

v,

0.8**
(0.4)
3.4***
(0.3)
459
0.01

84
Robust

v,

-0.3
(0.2)
3.4***
(0.2)
459
0.00

Sl 1s the CFA versus all other non-CFA, 82 1s the CFA versus the non-CFA-non-pegged ERR,
S3 is the CFA versus the non-CFA-floating ERR, and S4 is the CFA versus non-CFA-Pegged ERR.
The dependent variable is the average growth of money velocity.
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.5: Short Run Inflation Estimation: CFA vs. All NonCFA Countries

VARIABLES
1fit-1

Oper1;,
TT,,
CFA,

Pooled Pa.nel OLS

FE

Pooled Panel OLS

1f"it

1fit

'lrit

1rit

0.7***
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.01)
2.3***
(0.7)
-3.1 ***
(1.02)

0.6***
(0.03)
0.02
(0.02)
2.4***
(0.8)

0.7***
(0.02)
-0.003

2.4*
(1.4)
807

0.3
(1.9)
807
0.41
37

1.3
(1.6)
723

0.6***
(0.03)
-0.005
(0.01)
2.6***
(0.8)
-3.5***
(1.13)
0.05*
(0.02)
-0.005
(0.03)
-0.004
(0.004)
1.6
(1.6)
713

37

37

growthM2,,_ 1
GrowthRGDP,,_ 1

(O.Dl)
2.4***
(0.8)
-3.2***
(1.13)
0.04
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.03)

M2Velocityit-l
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Number of Groups
37
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10

The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

Pooled Panel OLS
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Table 1.6: Short Run Inflation Estimation: CFA users vs. Non-CFANonP,gs
Pooled Panel OLS
VARJABLES
7Tit-1

Open;,
TT,,
CFA,

FE

Pooled Panel OLS

1rit

1fit

1fit

1fit

0.7***
(0.02)
-0.007
(0.01)
2.3***
(0.8)
-3.3***

0.6***
(0.03)
0.02
(0.02)
2.6***
(0.9)

0.7***
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.01)
2.8***
(0.8)
-2.1 *

0.6***
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.01)
2.8***
(0.8)
-2.1 **

(1.1)
growthM2,,_ 1
GrowthRGDP,,_,

(1.1)

(1.1)

0.100***
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.03)

-0.2
(1.5)
692

0.191 ***
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.05
(1.5)
691

32

32

M2Velocity,,_ 1
Constant

Pooled Panel OLS

2.5*
(1.5)
726

Observations
R-squared
Number of Groups
32
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10

0.2
(2.04)
726
0.42
32

The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.7: Short Run Inflation Estimation: CFA users vs. NonCFAFloating

VARIABLES
'lrit-1

Open,,
TT;,
CFA;

Pooled Panel OLS

FE

Pooled Panel OLS

1fit

1rit

1rit

1rit

0.7***
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.01)
2.3***
(0.8)
-3.3***

0.6***
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
2.6***
(0.9)

0.7***
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.01)
2.8***
(0.8)
-2.1*

0.6***
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.01)
2.8***
(0.8)
-2.1 **

(1.1)

(1.1)

0.1 ***
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.03)

-0.2
(1.53)
692

0.2***
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.05
(1.5)
691

32

32

(1.1)
growthM2,,_ 1
GrowthRGDP,,_ 1
M2Velocity,,_ 1
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of Groups
Note: *** p < 0.01, **

2.5*
(1.51)
726
32

0.2
(2.04)
726
0.42
32

p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

Pooled Panel OLS
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Table 1.8: Short Run Inflation Estimation: CFA users vs. NonCFAPegged
Pooled Panel OLS
VARIABLES
1fit~l

Ope14,
TT,,
CFA;

FE

Pooled Panel OLS

Pooled Panel OLS

1fit

1fit

'lrit

1fit

0.2***
(0.05)
0.03***
(0.01)
0.1
(0.8)
-1.5

0.2***
(0.05)
0.04*
(0.02)
0.3
(0.8)

0.2***
(0.05)
0.03***
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.8)
-2.5*
(1.5)
-0.03
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.04)
3.1*
(1.8)

0.2***
(0.05)
0.04*
(0.02)
0.5
(0.8)

(1.1) .
growthM2,,_ 1
GrowthRGDP,,_,
M2VelocitYit-1
Constant

2.5
(1.6)

0.8
(1.6)

0 bservations

365

R-squared
Number of id
Note: *** p < 0.01,

17

365
0.06
17

327
17

** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

-0.02
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.21 **
(0.08)
1.8
(1.7)
327
0.11
17
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Figure 1.2: The Annual Average Real Interest rates (RIR): CFA vs. Non-CFA
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Appendix III: The Model by Kamin (1997)

Kamin (1997) studies the linkage between inflation and the ERR for Asian, industrialized and Latin American countries. The author constructes an inflation model that
incorporate the real GDP gap, nominal and real exchange rate as follows:

!';.P, = -a:>...,P + A.rer,_ 1 + aA.E(Qh- Qh)t-l

+ (1- a)LJ.P,* + (1- a)/';.e, + f3/';.P,_ 1

where, /';. is the difference operator, P, is the log of domestic CPI; rer is the log of
real exchange rate; Qh is the log of actual domestic output; Qh is the log of potential
output in domestic country; P,* is the log of foreign average weighted CPI,

e,_, is the

log of nominal exchange rate (local current per dollar US). t is current time index,
while t- 1 is the lag indicator (see Kamin, 1997 for the derivation of equation (4)).
Equation (4) is a short run inflation equation. To estimate equation for the sample
of SSA, I use GDP deflator inflation, and I obtained the potential GDP by applying
the Rodrick-Prescott filter methodology. Though not reported here, the estimation of
equation (4) shows that the CFA countries have only 0.6 percent less GDP inflation in
the short run compared to the non-CFA. Using the GDP deflator to estimate the long
run equation (3) gives similar results as using the CPI inflation above.
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Chapter 2
The Implications of HO and IRS
Theories in Sub-Saharan African
Thade
2.1

Introduction

The international trade flows within Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have
been low historically relative to both, the region's trade flows with other regions and
trade within other regions. The issue of the low demand for goods and services across
borders in SSA has been stressed in the literature and different authors suggest different
potential causes for the issue. Among others, tariff and non-tariff barriers, poor transport infrastructures, and poor private participations have been underlined to explain
the issue (e.g., Alemayehu and Haile, 2008; Buys, Uwe, and Wheeler, 2010). Manner
and Behar (2007) point out that the share of SSA countries' inter-regional trade in their
total trade volume exceeds 80 percent. They argue that the lower trade within the region is due to tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The gravity equation predicts lower trade
flows within SSA relative to trade between SSA and the rest of the world. Faezeh and
Pritchett (1993) compare the actual intra-SSA trade to the predictions of the gravity
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equation. They construct a gravity equation in which the trade volume between two
countries is a function of the trade potential 1 of each of the countries and the trade
attraction2 between them. Using import and export data from the UNCOMTRADE
at the 3-digit SITC level, they find that the predictions3 of the gravity equation are
similar to the actual trade within SSA.
Hanink and Owusu (1998) develop the trade intensity index on the basis of a
spatial interaction model to examine the trade within the economic community of West
African States (ECOWAS). Their results show that ECOWAS has failed to promote
trade between its members. Mansoor et al. (1989) measure trade potential as the value
of SSA's import from the rest of the world for products that at least one SSA country
is significantly exporting (significantly means, the value of imports represents at least 1
percent of that country's total exports to the rest of the world). For instance, suppose
SSA is importing a given good g from the rest of the world at time t and the import
value is one thousand (dollar U.S.). Suppose further that, at this particular timet, a
SSA country i is exporting this same good g to the rest of the world and one thousand
(dollar U.S.) represents at least 1 percent of i's total export value in good g. Then one
thousand (dollar U.S.) is the value of trade potential that is not exploited within the
region. They use the disaggregated UNCOMTRADE data at 4-digit SITC and find
that the intra-SSA trade potential was only 16 percent of the region's total export in
1983.
The literature has thoroughly demonstrated that the imports between SSA
countries are low. However, no author has investigated the implications of the region's
factor endowments and its level of product differentiation in explaining the lack of
1

Their measure of a country's trade potential includes factors such as economic size, GDP per

capita, trade intensity-the ratio of trade to GDP, and the geography of the country (area, island or
not island).
2

The trade attraction is estimated from the distance between the two countries as the proxy for

the transport cost, common language, and political barriers to trade.
3 The actual imports and exports within SSA were respectively 8.1 and 4.5 percent of the region's
trade with the rest of the world, while the predictions of the gravity equation were 7.5 for imports and
4.5 percent for exports.
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comparative advantage in production within SSA and understanding why trade flows
remain low in this region. The dllference in factor endowment proportions and the extent of product dllferentiation are important in enhancing trade between countries. The
high volatility in the prices of world primary commodities and the resulting dramatic
disturbances in African trade during the last decade have led Breton et al. (2011) 4 to
conclude that the key development solution for Africa remains export diversification.
Although not empirically explained, producing differentiated products is one of the
main challenges African countries must undertake to boost their regional trade.
The debate about the regional trade in SSA remains one of the critical issues
when it comes to economic development. The importance of this issue has led regional
leaders to engage in multilateral free trade agreements and subdivide the region into
overlapping custom unions and free trade areas. Despite all arrangements to boost
regional trade, import flows in SSA remain low. In fact, imports of Africans from
Africans have never exceeded 20 percent of the region's imports from the remaining
world nor has it exceeded a quarter of the region's exports towards the rest of the world
(see details in the next section).
The goal of this paper is to examine the driving forces of bilateral trade
within SSA. In particular, I investigate whether the regional trade of SSA arises from
cross-product specialization resulting from differences in factor abundances (HeckscherOhlin) or from intra-industry trade resulting from increasing returns to scale (IRS) production technology and product differentiation. My results show that the differences in
factor endowment ratios within SSA are low, which indicates trade does not arise from
cross-product specialization. In fact, SSA countries exhibit similar factor endowment
proportions. 60 percent of the region's imports are made of homogeneous goods. The
average regional Grubel-Lioyd index is low5 (0.03) over the period I consider. The
4
Africa Trade Policy Notes No. 15 - The Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department of the Africa Region of the World Bank.
5 Note that the maximum Grube! Lloyd index is 1, thus the SSA regional Grube! Lloyd is 0.03 out
of 1.
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low value of the Grubel-Lloyd index indicates that there is less possibility of exchanging varieties of differentiated goods. The limited patterns of product varieties cannot
generate intra-industry trade within the region. This paper shows that the conditions
for specialization in production under both HO and IRS theories are not met in SSA.
There is little room for potential trade within SSA. The empirical results in this paper
imply that industrialization and manufacturing different product varieties is crucial in
boosting the region's trade in the long run.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: Section 2 gives an historical
overview of trade in SSA. Section 3 briefly reviews the literature on trade theories.
Section 4 outlines the methodology, explains the model, and summarizes the data and
sources. Section 5 shows the investigation results and their implications while section
6 concludes the paper. Tables and Figures are provided in separate sections.

2.2
2.2.1

Overview of Sub-Saharan African Trade
Product Composition of Sub-Saharan Africa Trade

The bilateral imports of non-fuel products of African countries from other African
countries are mainly composed of primary commodities. These commodities are agricultural goods and manufactured6 goods that mainly consist of consumer goods. Although
primary commodities, the composition of the African products has changed over the
last decades. This change in the composition of the goods in SSA has remarkably affected the rate of imports within the region. In fact, between 1970 and the late 1980s,
a large proportion of commodities traded in SSA consisted of agricultural goods. The
6 Note that the manufactured goods used in this section do not include machinery and transport
equipment. The reason for the exclusion is because a large portion of machinery and transport
equipment imported within SSA are products of China and India. In recent decades, trade has
intensified between India, China, and Africa. As Broadman (2007) explains, this increased partnership
is due to the economic complementarities between the two regions. The Asian countries essentially
export machinery and transport equipment towards some key African countries (i.e., South Africa and
Nigeria). From these countries, these products are exported to other countries in the region (Kaplinsky
et a!., 2006).
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share of manufactured goods was low relative to that of the agricultural goods up to
the late 1980s (Figure 1). Noticeably, over that decade the total import level within
SSA was stagnant and low as shown in Figure 2.
From the late 1980s, the share of manufacturing goods in the total import
increased. The proportion of the manufactured goods in the total imports value within
SSA surpassed that of the agricultural goods in the mid-1990s. As shown in Figure 2,
the curve of intra-SSA imports changed from being flat. It is upward sloping. There
is an argument that the observed dramatic increase in the SSA regional imports in the
2000s results from the increase in the world demand for primary commodities, which
inflated their prices (see Gupta and Yang, 2006; Breton et al., 2011).
However, during the 1990s, even though there was not such a huge increase
in the world demand for primary commodities, the trend of the regional imports had
started to increase then. The moderate increase in the intra-SSA imports in the 1990s
was mainly due to the growth in manufactured goods over that period. As shown in
Figure 1, in the mid - 1990s, the share of manufactured goods surpassed that of the
agricultural goods in the total imports within SSA. In addition, there was a new trend
of an increase in the share of the manufactured goods beginning from the year 2000.
Although the rise in world demand for primary commodities significantly contributed
to the increase in imports within the region, a portion of this increase can be explained
by the growth in the share of manufactured products in the total regional trade around
that period. The reason is, even though the imports dropped after the unusual world
demand, the regional imports were still higher compared to their levels before the mid
- 1990s. These higher imports after the unusual event were essentially due to the
growing share of manufactured goods relative to the share of agricultural goods in the
total regional imports.
The above overview of the non-fuel commodities trade within SSA shows two
main points. First, commodities prices in SSA depend on world prices and so they
are vulnerable to external shocks. This is essentially because the commodities of SSA
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consist in general of primary commodities. The second point is that manufacturing has
positive effects on imports within SSA. These facts highlight the importance of product
differentiation in enhancing bilateral trade in SSA. Indeed, manufacturing goods is
the basis for product differentiation. SSA countries should shift their products from
primary commodities to high value added ones and produce them in different varieties.
Product differentiation will allow not only boosting the intra-regional demands, but
also reducing the region's vulnerability to world primary commodities prices change.

2.2.2

Trade within SSA versus Trade of SSA with the Rest of
the World

Historically, SSA countries trade a smaller share of their GDP among themselves
relative to the portion of GDP that they share with the rest of the world. To identify
how much are imports within SSA relative to SSA's imports from (exports to) the rest
of the world, I use aggregated data at UNCOMTRADE (1- digit SITC) to compute the
total export (import) values of SSA towards (from) the rest of the world per year, and
the yearly total intra- regional import value of SSA. Figures 3 and 4 provide respectively,
the ratio of intra-SSA imports to SSA 's exports to the world, and intra-SSA imports to
SSA's imports from the rest of the world. The observation reveals that imports within
SSA have always been smaller than the region's trade (both import and export) with
the remaining world.
SSA imports more from the world than within itself. As shown in Figure 4, the
proportion of the intra-regional imports in SSA's imports from outside the region has
been historically less than 10 percent. This proportion reached 20 percent in the mid2000s due to the worldwide increase in demand for primary commodities and the growth
of manufactured goods share in the regional trade (see Gupta and Yang, 2006; Breton
et al., 2011). Both, the ratios of regional imports to external exports and imports
increased from the late 80s to the mid - 2000s and then declines in the following years.
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The periods of increase and decrease in these ratios coincide with the period when the
share of manufacturing goods increased and declined. Thus, manufacturing can. explain
some part of the success in trade within SSA.
Despite the contribution of manufacturing to the regional trade enhancement,
trade within SSA is still not a grand success. Even though the share of manufactured
goods in the regional production has increased over the last decades, more than 60 percent of the region's product consists of non-manufactured goods; and imports within
SSA remain largely low compared to the region's trades with the rest of the world. This
indicates that the level of manufacturing is still too low to highly promote trade in the
region. The inability of SSA countries to add more value to their products (manufactured goods in a large extent) can be explained by the market access constraints that
these countries face. SSA countries are distant from developed markets from where
they import capital equipment and intermediate goods required for production. For
instance, Redding and Venables (2004) find that each 10 percent increase in ad valorem
transport costs of final output and intermediates goods is associated with a 30 percent
reduction in value added in the domestic country. Countries facing higher transport
costs (i.e., countries suffering from large markets and supplier access issues) are less
likely to produce high value added goods. In this paper, I examine how the extent of
manufacturing goods in different varieties and the difference in factors of production
proportions explain the level of demand across borders within SSA.

2.3

A Brief Literature Review on Bilateral Trade
Theories

Despite the improvement in trade within SSA during the last decades, the trade
flows within the region are still low. Different factors might explain the persistence
of the issue. This paper focuses on analyzing the factor endowments differences- the
Heckscher-Ohlin theory and the extent of product differentiation within SSA to explain
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why the regional trade is still low. The Heckscher-Ohlin model is the trade theory initiated by Heckscher (1919) and reformulated by Ohlin (1933). This theory provides a
basis for empirical analysis of the origins of comparative advantage. The model proposes that international differences in factor endowments are sources of comparative
advantage under two key assumptions: (1) the immobility of the factors of production
across borders: factors are immobile across borders but move freely across industries
within a country, (2) factor abundance does differ across countries but does not differ
too much so that countries are within the factor price equalization (FPE) set. The
relative factor endowment differences can lead to comparative advantage in the production of goods and services across countries. Within an industry this will reflect the
relative intensity of one factor over others in the production of a good or the marginal
rate of substitution between factors in the production process.
For bilateral trade to be enhanced within SSA, the countries must specialize in
particular goods or services in the production of which they have a comparative advantage over other countries. According to the HO theory, countries export the goods that
they produce intensively with their abundant factor. Thus, a labor abundant country
will specialize in and export goods that require labor intensively in their production
while a capital abundant country will specialize in and export a good that requires capital intensively in the production process. In the case where two countries have similar
factor endowments, they tend to trade less with each other because the production
prices of goods are similar across the two countries.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes that different combinations of the production factors are used in the production of different goods. Based on the HO theory, if
a country is abundant in factors that are used intensively in the production of a given
good, this country will have a comparative advantage in the production of that good
over other countries. Thus, this country would specialize in the production of this good
and export it to other countries that produce the good with higher costs.
Bilateral trade between two countries can also be intensified as a result of
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product differentiation where the love of varieties creates demand for products across
countries. Krugman (1979) initiates the theoretical framework for the idea of product
differentiation under the assumptions of increasing returns to scale (IRS) production
technology and monopolistic competition. Krugman's contribution has been extended
by a wide range of works (i.e., Krugman, 1980; Bergstrand, 1989; Eaton and Kortum,
2002; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008). This type of trade has been proven to
be the driving force of bilateral trade among industrialized nations. Helpman (1987)
and Dabaere (2002}' show that a large portion of trade between developed nations is
made up of trade between industries producing different varieties of a product. One of
the primary objectives of this paper is to study whether the IRS theory is relevant to
trade within SSA.
The HO and IRS theories are the foundations for empirical investigations on
international trade patterns. Moreover, the gravity equation which remains the most
successful model in explaining the variations in trade volume between countries, can be
derived from both of these two theories (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Evenett
and Keller, 2002). In the following sections, I employ Evenett and Keller's framework
to study the driving forces of trade within the SSA, and identify whether this region
exhibits opportunities for international trade based on the two theories.

2.4

Methodologies

I follow the empirical strategies of Evenett and Keller (2002) who tackle the factor
endowment difference and the increasing return to scale theories of trade in a framework
of the gravity equations. They study to what extent each of the theories explains the
7
Helpman (1987) uses a gravity model and provided support that the trade volume within a region
relative to the regional GDP is proportional to the dispersion index that measures the regional degree

of intra-industry trade. Debaere (2002) examines the results of Helpman (1987) on the samples of
14 OECD countries where product differentiation is of great importance and another sample of Non
OECDs with less differentiated goods. He concludes that the increasing similarity in GDP among the
OECD countries leads to higher bilateral trade whose large proportion consists of intra-industry trade.

Chapter 2. The Implications ofHO and IRS Theories in Sub-Saharan African Trade 44
volume of bilateral trade. I apply their methodology to the bilateral trade within SSA
region and compare it with that of other regions 8 The model of Evenett and Keller
(2002) is convenient under the goals of this paper because it can test the endowment
based issue and product differentiation from a single framework of a gravity equation.

2.4.1

Trade Theories and the Gravity Equation

Under the assumptions of perfect specialization, identical and homothetic preferences, and frictionless trade, one can derive a gravity equation, in which the value of
imports of a country i from a country j at time t is proportional to the product of the
GDPs of the two countries (Y" and YJ 1) divided by world GDP (Yw'):

..

M~Jt=

yityjt
ywt

---

(2.1)

where Mijt, Y", yjt, and ywt are respectively, imports of country i from country
), GDP of country i, GDP of country j and the world's GDP at timet (hereafter,
superscripts i, and j represent country indexes and t is the time index). This paper
modifies equation (1) to apply it to intra-regional trade.

i .,
MJ

=

yrt yityjt
ywty;:i

(2.2)

where, yrt is the regional GDP (hereafter, superscript r represents the regional index). Equation (1) or (2) above have very important theoretical features. They hold as
long as countries completely specialize in different products. Moreover, these equations
can be derived from the product differentiation, complete specialization across varieties,
as well as the cross-industry specification arising from factor endowment differences.
The increasing return to scale theory states that the love of varieties is what
creates demand for goods across borders. However, each country demands the varieties
8 East

and South Asia, Europe and North America, Latin America and Caribbean, and the Middle

East and North Africa.
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of differentiated goods from its partners relative to its GDP. If the two countries produce a common good (Z) (homogeneous good) and different varieties of another good

(X) (differentiated product), then each·country will import different varieties of the
differentiated good from the other country, but not the common good. Based on identical and homothetic preferences, the quantity of the varieties of goods that country i
imports from j is a function of i's share of world GDP, which in this case is: Y" /Yrt.
Nevertheless, the quantity of product varieties country i expects to import from j is
reduced as the share of homogeneous goods between the two countries increases.
The reason why bilateral trade between the countries declines in the presence
of a homogeneous good is the following: suppose the two partner countries produce
a given amount of a homogeneous commodity Z. The shares of the good Z in i and
j's GDPs are respectively Z' and zj. Country i's share of varieties in its GDP is

(1- Z")Y". Thus, i's share of world market is (1- Z")Y"/Y"". If there were no
common good produced in both countries, the importing country would import all
varieties from the partner at the full value of its share in the world GDP (Y" /Yw'). In
this case, equation (2) where the coefficient of the right hand side is unity would hold.
That is, i imports one hundred percent of the different varieties from j so does j from
i. With the existence of common good Z, the total imports of i from j is reduced by
the share Z''- Incorporating the share of homogeneous goods in equation (2) gives:
yrt yityjt

M'}'

=

(1- z iywt
t ) -yrt
--

(2.3)

We would expect high regression coefficients for country pairs where products
are differentiated than for country pairs with large shares of homogeneous goods. That
is: for Z" > 0 , the trade volume between partners declines. Consequently, countries
with high Grube! Lloyd index will tend to have a high alpha (a"), where a"

= (1- Z'').

Equation (3) holds perfectly to test trade based on the endowment proportion differences between countries as well. In the world of two countries, two goods, and two
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factors Heckscher-Ohlin model, each country exports the good that uses intensively its
abundant factors. If country i and j are respectively capital and labor abundant and
produce two homogeneous goods Z and X, the first country will export capital intensive
goods and the second country will export labor intensive goods. Suppose the production
of good X requires more capital and less labor than the production of good Z. Both of
the goods are produced in both countries. The amounts of X and Z produced in country i are X'' j(X''+Z") and Z"j(X''+Z'') with X'' /(X"+Z") > Z" j(X'' + Z''). On
the other hand, country j produces the shares z;t j(X;'+Z;') and X;' j(X;'+z;t) with

z;t j(X;t + z;t) > X;'/(X;t + z;'). Country i exports a demanded proportion a? of its
production Xit. Thus, the world market share-of country i is: Mijt =

, and the market share of country j is : Miit

Let I"

= (

(ax/ Xit)~: v;;t

az j zit)~: v;;t.

= ax I X" and ljt = az I z;t. It follows,

Miit _ (
-

0:

it yrt yityjt

x;xit) yrt yityjt _
ywt

yrt

-

{

_
-

{

ywt

yrt

(3'),

and
Miit _ (
-

0:

zjzit) ywt
yrt yityjt
yrt

Jt

yrt yityjt

ywt

yrt

(3"),

where ax in equation (3') and az in equation (3") are respectively the quantity of
good X demanded by country j from country i and the quantity of good Z demanded
by country i from country j.
From the above demonstration, we would expect lit and l;t to be higher when
the capital to labor ratios differ sharply across the two countries at a particular time

t. This is because the large difference in factor endowments will cause each country
to specialize in the production of the good it produces intensively with its abundant
factor, and rely on its partner for the consumption of the other good. By relying
on each other, the demand increases between the two countries. Therefore, 1" and

l;t decrease when endowment ratio differences between the countries decline. In the
extreme case if both countries are capital or labor abundant, ax or az will tend to
zero. This will characterize the "zero trade" case in a Heckscher-Ohlin model when
endowments are identical. The coefficient lit and l;t from estimating equations (3', 3")

Chapter 2. The Implications of HO and IRS Theories in Sub-Saharan African Trade 47
are expected to be smaller when factor endowments are similar or/and when products
are not differentiated (i.e., in the presence of large shares of homogeneous goods).
Additional modifications from equations (1), (2), and (3) are the inclusion of
the dummy for common language - if the two countries have a common official language
(CLijr); the dummy for colonial links if the importing country was a colony (Colijr );

the dummy for contiguity if the two countries share a common border (Contigiir ); the
log ofthe distance between the two countries (Dijr) and the landlocked dummy (LLijr
). After inclusion of these control variables and taking the log function, equation (3)
becomes:

•t

Log(Mijtr)

=

•t

oi'r +ai'r Log( Y' Y' )+f3CLijr +15Col'jr+8Contigijr +{)Log(Dijr)+pLLijr +<ijtr
yrt
.

(2.4)
where the constant term (a"r) captures ytr /Yw'- This paper estimates equation
(4) using a panel pooled ordinary least square (OLS). Baltagi and Khanti-Akom (1990)
stress that the Haussmann-Taylor (hereafter, HT) (1981) estimation methodology is
the best estimator for equations where potential correlation might exist between the
explanatory variables and the individual specific effects. Baltagi and Khanti-Akom
(1990) argue that with the HT estimation methodology, the within transformation
does not eliminate the individual effects and it corrects the within estimator when
individual effects are correlated with the explanatory variables.
Another way to recover individual specifics is the use of fixed effect estimation.
However, the fixed effect estimation automatically drops the time invariant variables.
This is an issue with the gravity estimations where country specifics such as distance
between countries, the common language, or common border between two countries or
landlocked dummies are time invariant. If the time invariant variables are uncorrelated
with the country pair effects, then one can recover the fixed effects using the two
stage least square (2SLS) (i.e., estimate OLS on the residuals of fixed effect regression
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(Baltagi, 2009)). For these econometric reasons, some gravity estimations have recently
employed the HT estimation methodology. For instance, Serlenga and Shin (2007)
estimate the gravity equation of bilateral trade among 15 European countries using the
HT estimation methodology. They argue that in addition to recovering the country
specific effects of variables such as distance, common border, and common language,
the HT methodology allows these variables to be endogeneous.
Even though the HT methodology tackles the endogeneity problem, I use the
pooled OLS because the type of gravity equation I nse in this paper allows little correlation between the explanatory variable and the dummies (country specifics). Serlenga
and Shin (2007) use GDP, the differences in relative factor endowment between trading partners (RLF), dummy on similarity in relative size (SIM), dummy on European
community membership (CEE), common currency (EMU) and the common language
dummies as the endogeneous variable when applying the HT methodology. Obviously,
the design of their gravity equation exhibits potential endogeneity and it is reasonable
for them to use the HT estimator. GDP, the relative country size and the difference in
relative endowment could be correlated. In addition, most of the 15 European countries
in their sample are members of the "CEE" and the "EMU".
The gravity equation by Evenett and Keller (2002) used in this paper is designed
in such a way that the main explanatory variables are combined in the countries' sizes.
The endowments proportion differences are intended to be part of the GDP and be
reflected through the coefficient of the estimation. The main explanatory variable in
this gravity equations, yityjt ;yrt turns out to be less correlated with the dummies
which reflect the country specifics. The matrix of correlation between the variables is
given in Table 8 and the results from estimating equation (4) are stored in Table 6.
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2.4.2

The Data Summary

The overview of the historical trade in SSA is observed over the period from
1970 through 2007 using aggregated data at the 1-digit SITC of the UNCOMTRADE
database. However, due to the lack of historical data on the capital stock and the labor
force, for the empirical investigation I use a panel of eleven years (from 1997 to 2007)
on 136 countries9 grouped into five regions. 10 The bilateral trade data is retrieved from
the IMF's direction of trade (DOT) and UNCOMTRADE. The data on real gross
domestic product (RGDP) converted into purchasing power parity (PPP), the capital
stock, the labor force, and the population is retrieved from the IMF's International
Financial Statistics (IFS). The gross capital formation was retrieved from the World
Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) data and is adjusted by the depreciation
rate of 6 percent. The gross capital formation is used as a proxy for countries' capital
stock.
The data includes countries with valid data on capital stock and labor force
over the indicated period. Note that capital and labor are used as the main factor
endowments in this paper. Whenever a country lacks the data on capital stock or
labor force for a given year, the countries pairs in which that country is involved are
dropped out. This is because the paper is interested in investigating the endowment
ratio difference across countries. All variables are converted to purchasing power parity
adjusted in real international dollars to be internationally comparable. The averages of:
the number of trade relations per importing countries in SSA, the countries' GDP per
capita, and the capital per worker over the period from 1997 to 2007 are summarized in
Table 4. The capital to labor ratio is also calculated for countries within each region.
The maxiroum and minimum capital per worker and the average capital per worker
within each region between 1997 to 2007 are reported in Table 1.
9 The

list of countries by region is given in Table 9.
EU -NAM, LAC, MENAF, and SSA denote respectively region of East Asia and Pacific
and South Asia, Europe and North America, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North
10 Asia,

Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
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This paper follows the literature to test the rates of intra industry trade by
computing the Grube!-Lloyd index. The data used to calculate the Grube!-Lloyd index
(1975) is extracted from the UNCOMTRADE database on two-way trade at the 3
digit level in SITC. To assess the extent of product differentiation, the paper classifies
the commodities by differentiated and homogeneous goods based on Rauch (1999) and
Hallak (2006) concordance. Only the differentiated goods are used to calculate the
Grube! Lloyd index. The average regional Grube! Lloyd index over the period from
1997 to 2007 is reported in Table 2.
The Grube!-Lloyd index is computed using the following equation:
I:;

GLijtr =

~~jtr

Mjitrj

1- [:E 9 l~jtT- ~itrl], where 0 <
g

g

+Mg

GLijr

< 1

where, g represents a commodity. G Lijtr is the Grube!-Lloyd index and reflects the
degree of intra-industry trade (imports and exports) of country i from (to) country j.
M;;tr is the export value from country i to country j in a differentiated good and Mjitr
is the import value of country i from j in the good g.

The Grube! Lloyd index reflects the degree of intra-industry trade in differentiated
goods. This index can be assessed only if a good is simultaneously imported and
exported by a country from (to) the other country. GLiitr equals zero whenever g is
either exported or imported only. In contrast, if the value of imports is equal to the
value of exports in commodity g, then GL'itr equals unity. Therefore, the Grube!-Lloyd
index allows determining the proportion of intra-industry trade in the regional trades.
The shares of differentiated and homogeneous goods in the total trade volume as well as
the capital to labor ratios are calculated to further highlight the nature of endowments
and the characteristics of goods in SSA trade. This exercise is conducted for all regions
to facilitate the comparison of SSA to other regions. Note that the relatively higher
GLijtr index indicates intensive intra-industry trade or the existence of the wide range

of product varieties tradable between industries across borders.
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2.5
2.5.1

Results and Interpretation
The Endowments Proportions and Intra-Industry Trade
in Sub-Saharan Africa

The endowment analysis shows that SSA countries are in the majority labor abundant. The ratios of capital to labor within SSA indicate that there is less capital
available per worker in SSA as compared to that within other regions. On average, the
value of capital per labor in SSA is 546 ($ U.S.) and it is the lowest as compared to
the value of capital per worker in other regions (Table 1). Factor endowment ratios are
similar across countries in SSA than in other regions. The mean difference in the capital
to labor ratio in SSA is 845 and it is also the lowest among regions. In SSA, the minimum difference in the factor production ratio is between Burundi and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), whereas the maximum difference in this ratio is between
Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe. More than 38 pairs of countries in SSA exhibit no
significant difference in factor endowment ratios (factor proportion difference is close
to zero between the countries composing the pair). The endowment ratio within SSA
indicates that the region is labor abundant rather than capital abundant. Given the
countries' endowments, the opportunity cost of producing capital intensive goods in
SSA is high. This indicates the lack of comparative advantage in the production of
goods within the region. Therefore, specialization in production of goods based on the
factor endowments is less likely to occur in SSA.
There are few varieties of differentiated goods traded in SSA. From 1997 to
2007, the imports of SSA countries from other SSA countries was mainly composed
of: tobacco; metallic structures; furniture; cotton fabrics; footwear; perfumery and
cosmetics; fertilizers; road motor vehicles; alcoholic beverages; rubber tires; telecommunication equipment; wood simply worked; tools; electric machinery parts; printed
matter and medicaments. As we can see, the manufactured goods in SSA are mostly
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consumption goods, not high value added goods. In addition, most of the SSA countries do not intensively participate in trade in differentiated goods. Over the total
period of observation, South Africa's share of the total market value in differentiated
goods is almost 50 percent. The remaining countries have shares of market value which
are less than 5 percent (Table 5). The lower participation and the limited patterns of
differentiated goods are indications of the less extent of differentiated goods and the
low trade within the region.
Intra-industry trade is ahnost missing in SSA. The average regional Grube!
Lloyd index - which measures the rate of trade between industries across borders, is
low in SSA compare to that of other regions (Table 2). The average Grube! Lloyd
index is 0.03 in SSA and the index is zero for more than 60 percent of the countries
over many years. The lack of intra- industry trade reflects the fact that products
are not differentiated in the region. Thus, specialization based on the IRS theory
cannot take place under these conditions. The factor endowment and increasing return
to scale theories of trade explain why SSA countries trade less among themselves.
Based on the HO theory the lower difference in factor proportions cannot generate
perfect specialization within SSA whereas the absence of product differentiation reduces
bilateral trade.
The low extent of product differentiation in SSA can be explained by the lack
of technology which is known as the driving factor of labor productivity. Whether new
technologies are available or not in the production process in SSA, their application
requires skilled labor force. However, SSA has a very small share of its labor force that
can be considered as skilled workers. In fact, using the education level of individuals
as the proxy for their skills, the percentage of people aged 15 and older with secondary
education as well as the percentage of population aged 25 and above with tertiary
education are negligeable in SSA compared to that in other regions (Table 3).
In fact, the proportion of skilled workers in the total labor force matters to
the extent of how countries trade. The degree of trade between two countries turns
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out to also depend on the skills in both countries. In the Tables (10, 11, 12) in the
Appendix Annex, I use the total proportion of people aged 15 and above as a proxy for
the skilled labor. Then, I merged all pairs from all regions to create five v classes: (1)
with v increasing by the increasing order of education in the importing country (Table
10); (2) v increasing by the increasing order of education in the exporting country
(Table 11); and (3) v increasing by the increasing order of the sum of the proportions
of education in both countries (Table 12).
After estimating equation 4, the results show that the proportions of educated
people in both, the partner countries matter to trade between them. The coefficient
of yityjt ;yrt in Table 12 increases as v increases. However, the effect of education on
trade is not clear in Tables 10 and 11. The order of the coefficients of yityjt ;yrt in
Tables 10 and 11 are ambiguous. This can be explained by the fact that v is ranked
only by the education in one country of the pair. So, the other country forming the pair
might have lower or higher level of education, leading to an ambiguous effect. From
this point of view, with the lower level of education within SSA, the lower extent of
trade in this region is also not surprising.

2.5.2

The Results from the Gravity Equations

The coefficient alpha (aitr) from estimating equation (4) is lower for the regions
where the share of homogeneous goods in total imports is high. It is not surprising
that Latin America, the Middle East and SSA have similar and low coefficients (aitr)
compared to that of Asia and Europe. In fact, Latin America, the Middle East and
SSA have lower intra industrial trade expressed as small Grube! Lloyd index. Moreover, these regions have higher share of homogeneous goods relative to the shares of
differentiated goods in their total import. The average difference in the endowment
proportions for these three regions are lower compared to that of Asian and European
samples.
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SSA has the lowest rate of intra industrial trade and the lowest average difference in the factor endowment ratios. SSA's coefficient alpha (oitr

=

0.04) being similar

to that of Latin America and slightly greater than that of the Middle East might re-sult from SSA having relatively higher share of differentiated goods in total imports
compared to that of the other two regions. This indicates that SSA could trade more
by differentiating more its products.
Product differentiation and the relative endowment differences between countries are critical in enhancing bilateral trade. This is supported as well by the benchmark exercise conducted in this paper. I merged all the samples and subdivided it into
two subsamples using a benchmark of GLijrll

=

0.05. The first subsample includes

pairs countries with GLijr less than 0.05 and the second includes pairs with GLiir
greater than 0.05. The subsamples include pairs with valid GLijr and difference in
factor endowment numbers. The sample of lower GL'ir contains 12,502 observations
and that of higher G Lijr has 18028 observations. I estimate equation (4) for each of the
two subgroups. The coefficient (o/i'r) for the lower GLiir sample is 0.01 and that of the
higher GLiJr sample is 0.08. Both coefficients are significant at 99 percent confidence
(Table 7, last row). This indicates a 1 percent increase in the GDPs of countries with
low GL will increase trade between them by only 1 percent, while similar increase in
GDP for countries with high GLijr will boost their bilateral trade by 8 percent. The
difference in the GLiir, which reflects the degree of product differentiation, makes a
large difference in the trade patterns. ·
In addition, I subdivided each of the two subgroups into five classes named v
classes (v =1, 2, 3, 4, 5). Within the lower GLiir group, v increases in the increasing
order of the difference in factor endowment ratios (DFER). Meaning for instance that
the DFER in the class of v =5 is greater than that of the v =1 class. There are about
2,500 observations per v class within the low GLijr subgroup. Similar v classes are
created in the subgroup of the high G Lijr. However, in this group, the v classes are
11

G£ijr without subscript t reflects the period average
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first ranked by increasing GL'ir order and then by increasing DFER order. The v classes
of the higher G L'ir have about 3,605 observations each. After creating the v classes,
I estimate each class sample using equation (4) and following the same estimation
methodology- pooled panel OLS. As shown in Table 7, within the low GLijr sample,
the estimation coefficients are all significant at 95 percent confidence. These a~ increase
as the DFER increases and reaches the largest value of 0.012 for the v =4 class. The
lower coefficient for the v =5 class could result from many pairs having extremely lower

GLijr despite their higher DFER.
Similar patterns of the a~ is observed within two class types of the high G Lijr
sample. For the classes ranked by increasing G Lijr order, the a~ increases as the G Lijr
rate increases and reaches the maximum at the class of v

=

4. In the other ordering

classes within the high G L ijr, the coefficients seem not to change much across the
three first classes. But these coefficients are high for the last two classes. Interestingly
from this analysis, the coefficients (a~) are significant and large in magnitude for all
classes and ordering within the high GLijr sample than within the low GLijr sample.
Moreover, within the high GL'ir sample, the higher v classes have higher a~ in each
of the two ordering. This indicates the importance of product differentiation and the
relative endowment differences.
The IRS and the HO explain why trade flows are low in SSA. The lower factor
endowment ratio differences and the less extent of intra industrial trade cannot generate
perfect specialization. Given these results, trade policies like custom unions or free trade
agreements are likely to fail in SSA. SSA countries have similar factors of production,
they produce homogeneous primary commodities and the level of product differentiation
is not high enough to allow specialization and increase demand across the border. Trade

policies to boost trade within SSA must focus on how to manufacture the regional goods
in different varieties.
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2.6

Conclusion

The finding of this paper supports those of the previous works that SSA trades
less within itself. However, this paper uses the HO and IRS theories to show that the
lack of comparative advantage in production is an impediment to bilateral trade in
SSA. I argue that the homogeneity of the factor proportions and the lack of product
varieties lower demand across borders in SSA. Similar factor endowment ratios and the
insignificant extent of product differentiation in SSA cannot generate perfect specialization and enhance regional trade. Based on these results, trade policies that aimed
to promote trade within the region (i.e., FTA, custom unions) are likely to fail because
SSA countries produce similar homogeneous agricultural products. Product differentiation is the key to the success of trade within SSA. The main challenges are therefore
industrialization and manufacturing products in more varieties.
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2.7

Tables

Table 2.1: The Average Regional Capital per Labor, Countries with the
Minimum aud the Maximum Capital per Labor between 1997 aud 2007

Region Name
Europe and North America
East and South Asia
Middle East and North Africa
Latin America and Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa

Capital to Labor Ratio (C I L)
AVVKL1 Min C I L Country
10,043
Romania: 283.7
Afghanistan: 64.7
3,746
3,234
Djibouti: 147
Guyana: 286.5
2,219
DRC2 : 7.25
546

Max C I L Country
Norway: 15,216
Australia: 20,509
Emirates: 15,600
Bahamas: 15,556.6
Equatorial Guinea: 18,256

1

Average value of capital per labor.
lowest value of cj L between 1997 and 2007 was recorded in Democratic Republic of Congo (7.25 in 1998).
Source: Author's calculation using WDI database.

2 The

Table 2.2: Regional Grube! Llyod Index, Shares of Differentiated aud Homogeneous Goods (1997- 2007)
Regional Grube! Llyod Index
Mean Minimum Maximum
Region Name
0.43
0.00
Europe and North America
0.24
0.28
East and South Asia
0.12
0.00
0.16
0.00
Latin America and Caribbean 0.05
0.17
0.00
Middle East and North Africa 0.05
0.11
0.00
0.03
Sub-Saharan Africa
1

Drfferentmted Goods.
Homogeneous Goods.
Source: Author's calculation using UNCOMTRADE data.
2

DG 1
72
70
34
34
40

HG2
28
30
66
66
60
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Table 2.3: The Proportion of Skilled Labor in the Regional Labor Force

Region Name
ASIA
EU andNAM
LAC
MENA
SSA
1

1

15 Years and Older 25 Years and Older
'
Total 15+ in SS (%) "15+ css (%) 3 Total 25+ in TS (%)
6.5
13.9
27.3
20.9
39.9
10.6
10.9
26.2
5.6
20.3
10.8
6.1
4.9
13.9
1.4

Total of people aged 15 and above m Secondary School.
'People aged 15 and above who completed Secondary School.
3
Total of people aged 25 and above in Tertiary School.
4
People aged 25 and above who completed Tertiary School.
Source: Five Years Average of Attainable Education by Barro and Lee from 1950 to 2010.

4

25 + CTS (%)
3.9
6.8
3.6
3.8
0.8
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Table 2.4: Average Trade Relations, GDP per Capita and Capital to Labor
Ratio (1997 to 2007)
Country Name
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Democratic Republic of Congo
Congo, Republic
Cote d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Niger
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

# of Trade Relations GDP/Capita Capital to Labor
27
35
31
24
35
32
30
26
21
32
35
31
20
27
32
32
32
34
13
36
35
31
31
35
31
29
32
35
29
36
36
30
35
36
31

1218
452
299
113
786

1668
302
337
515
115
1265
763
7433
148
5084
318
481
388
173
483
284
204
319
4430
266
202
266
631
212
3904
318
305
282
503
509

384
209
124
20
357
1309
62
216
126
29
739
215
8337
73
2928
153
251
152
63
179
118
84
278
2486
113
87
93
339
57
1938
133
127
132
276
126

Chapter 2. The Implications of HO and IRB Theories in Sub-Saharan Africau Trade 60

Table 2.5: Statistics on Trade in Differentiated Goods in SSA (1997-2007)
IV'
EVl RMS3 (%) GLJ4
Reporter Name
South Africa
42781.6 6502.3
47.16
0.027
3107.8 1650.9
4.55
0.023
Kenya
1153.0 3556.7
0.031
4.51
Zimbabwe
4112.8
Mozambique
246.0
0.027
4.17
644.9
3177.5
Nigeria
3.66
0.029
679.0
3090.1
3.61
0.027
Cote d'Ivoire
609.0
3034.7
Ghana
0.027
3.49
475.8
2448.3
2.80
0.025
Tanzania
309.8
2347.3
2.54
0.026
Burkina Faso
2440.0
Mali
73.7
2.41
0.026
366.4
2073.4
0.027
Malawi
2.33
1263.2
0.023
Mauritius
906.0
2.08
1394.0
756.2
Senegal
2.06
0.023
0.029 .
1103.5
1024.2
2.04
Togo
137.8
1584.3
0.021
Uganda
1.65
993.6
620.8
Botswana
1.54
0.033
652.1
911.7
0.027
Benin
1.50
129.3
1249.1
Madagascar
1.32
0.021
447.1
819.2
1.21
0.025
Cameroon
0.022
38.9
745.3
Guinea
0.75
640.5
Gabon
126.5
0.73
0.022
92.2
504.1
0.024
Niger
0.57
58.6
0.49
0.031
457.8
Namibia
20.9
470.7
Rwanda
0.47
0.025
416.8
28.2
0.43
0.024
Ethiopia
37.1
380.4
0.022
Seychelles
0.40
383.3
Gambia
32.5
0.40
0.022
16.2
306.1
0.023
0.31
Burundi
239.0
21.7
0.25
0.024
Sierra Leone
28.8
173.2
Guinea-Bissau
0.19
0.022
145.3
CAF 5
4.5
0.14
0.020
0.021
3.5
119.8
0.12
Comoros
18.2
41.1
0.06
0.024
Eritrea
14.3
38.3
0.05
0.022
Cape Verde
10.3
So Tom and Prncipe
7.6
0.02
0.026
.
.
..
1
2
Import Value (million$ U.S.); Export Value (nnlhon $U.S.);
3

Regional Market Share; 4 Grubel Llyod index; 5 Central African Republic.

Source: Author's calculation using UNCOMTRADE data.
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Table 2.6: Estimation of Equation (4) using Pooled Panel OLS
VARIABLES
Log(Yityjt ;yrt)
LL'ir
ContigiJr
CL'ir
Colijr
log( Dist'Jr)

Constant
0 bservations
Number of Groups

Asia1
Log(Mijtr)
0.15***
(0.002)
0.32
(0.63)
2.4**
(0.93)
2.33***
(0.55)
-8.9***
(2.66)
-0.67**
(0.32)
5.06*
(2.7)
6,170
606

EU-NAM 2
Log(Mijtr)
0.08***
(0.002)
-2.81 ***
(0.94)
10.78***
(1.4)
11.03***
(1.46)
-12.35***
(1.62)
-2.86***
(0.45)
22.3***
(3.36)
9,900
900

LAC3
Log(Mijtr)
0.04***
(0.0003)
-0.06
(0.06)
0.52***
(0.06)
0.002
(0.03)
-0.56**
(0.29)
-0.01 **
(0.02)
0.11
(0.18)
6,339
631

1 East

and South Asm; 2 Europe and North Amenca
America and Caribbean; 4 Middle East and North Mrica·;
5
Su~Saharan Africa.

3 Latin

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

0.08
(0.05)
0.06
(0.04)

SSA 5
Log(Mijtr)
0.04***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.02***
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)

-0.06***
(0.02)
0.42***
(0.15)
2,306
247

-0.004***
(0.001)
0.025***
(0.01)
11,658
1,151

MENA4
Log(Mijtr)
0.03***
(0.001)
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Table 2.7: Benchmark Case: Estimation of Equation (4) for Different Classes
of GL and DFER
HO Model: Low-GL (GL'ji0.05)
v,Classes
v
V=

1

V=

2

V=

3

V=

4

V=

5

All Observations

0.002**
(0.000825)
0.003**
(0.00ll9)
O.Oll ***
(0.000542)
0.012***
(0.000699)
0.005***
(0.000731)
0.010***
(0.000334)

IRS/HO Model: High-GL (GL'1 i.0.05)
v

v

0.013***
(0.000432)
0.032***
(0.000594)
0.153***
(0.00205)
0.265***
(0.00413)
0.070***
(0.00230)
0.088***
(O.OOlll)

0.088***
(0.00220)
0.060***
(0.00204)
0.059***
(0.00196)
0.136***
(0.00397)
0.123***
(0.00160)
0.088***
(0.00111)

1

v, ranked in increasmg order of DFEK' Within the lower Grube! Lloyd (GL) sample.
ranked in increasing order of GL within the higher GL sample.
3 vi ranked in increasing order of DFER within the higher GL sample.
4
Differnce in Factor Endowment Ratio.
2

vi

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

Variables

MiJt

Miit

1
0.49
-0.051
-0.0201
0.0914
0.1638
-0.1378

yityjt/yrt
LL'j
CL'j
Colij
Contig'j
D'j

Table 2.8: Correlation Matrix
yityjt;yrt
CL'j
LL'j
Col'j
1
-0.0604
-0.053
0.218
0.0134
0.0459

1
0.0352
-0.0153
0.0651
-0.0403

1
0.0106
0.1205
0.0058

1
0.1093
-0.1105

Contigij

DiJ

1
-0.4479

1
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Table 2.9: Countries List by Region
ASIA
Mghanistan
Australia
Bangladesh
Brunei
Cambodia
Hong Kong
China
Fiji
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea, Rep.
Lao
Malaysia
Maldives
Moldova
Nepal
New Zealand
Pakistan
PNG
Philippines
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Thailand
Vanuatu
Vietnam

EU-NAM
Albania
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovak Rep.
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

LAC
Argentina
Bahamas, The
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Tonga
TTO
Uruguay
Venezuela

MENA
Algeria
Bahrain
Djibouti
Egypt
Iran
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Mauritania
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Sri Lanka
Tunisia
Emirates

SSA
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
CAF
Chad
Comoros
DRC
Congo, Rep.
Cote d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Niger
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Table 2.10: Estimating Equation (4) by Inc:reasing" Order of Education 1 of the
Importing Country

All

ll=

2

VARIABLES

log(M'i')

log(M'i')

log(Yityit /Yrt)

0.08***
(0.002)
-0.8**
(0.35)
3.47***
(0.51)
0.15
(0.29)
-4.75***
(1.08)
-1.36***
(0.175)
11.21 ***
(1.38)
5,204
2,678

0.003***
(0.001)
0.001
(Oc006)
0.03***
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.40***
(0.05)
-0.002**
(0.00436)
0.02
(0.036)
1,041
592

0.08***
(0.002)
0.05
(0.24)
-0.44
(0.32)
0.03
(0.19)
-0.32
(1.44)
-0.34***
(0.123)
2.76***
(0.99)
1,043
672

Contig'i
CL'i
Col'1
log(Dist'i)
Constant
Observations
Number of Groups
2

1

log(M'i')

LL'i

1

!I=

!I=

3

4

!I=

5

log(M'i')

log(M'it)

0.04***
(0.003)
-0.28
(0.40)
1.51 ***
(0.44)
-0.87****
(0.25)
-0.25
(0.97)
-0.31 **
(0.139)
3.16***
(1.08)
1,039
683

0.07***
(0.004)
-1.423*
(0.73)
7.02***
(1.00)
-0.19*
(0.60)
-3.60**
(1.66)
-1.26***
(0.351)
10.93***
(2.68)
1,039
663

0.08***
(0.003)

The total proportiOn of people aged from 15 and above m the tertiary school1s used.
The lower v, the lower the proportion of people in the tertiary school.

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

ll=

log(M'i')

17.31 ***
(2.38)
3.25**
(1.36)
-14.11 ***
(2.61)
-3.8***
(0.644)
30.46***
(5.08)
1,043
588
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Table 2.11: Estimating Equation (4) by Inereasing 2 Order of Education' of the
Exporting Country

VARIABLES
Log(Y''yJt /Yr')
LL'J
Contig'J
CL'J
Cot'J
log( dist'J)

Constant
Observations
Number of Groups

V= 1
log(M'J')
0.17***
(0.002)
0.003
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.25**
(0.12)
-0.003***
(0.01)
0.02
(0.09)
1,041
608

v= 2
log(M'J')
0.11***
(0.004)
-0.21
(0.44)
1.3**
(0.63)
0.5
(0.36)
-0.39
(2.74)
-0.07***
(0.23)
0.37
(1.92)
1,041
691

V= 3
log(M'1')
0.06***
(0.002)
-0.29
(0.28)
1.6***
(0.37)
-0.6***
(0.21)
0.20
(0.89)
-0.32***
(0.12)
3.1 ***
(0.91)
1,040
680

v= 4
log(M'1')
0.09***
(0.003)
-0.16
(0. 72)
5.2***
(0.84)
-0.2
(0.50)
-3.86***
(1.39)
-1.54***
(0.30)
12.5***
(2.27)
1,040
660

1The total proportion of people aged from 15 and above m the tertiary school1s used.
2 The lower v, the lower the proportion of people in the tertiary school.

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

V= 5
log(M'J')
0.08***
(0.004)
-1.82
(1.42)
16.34***
(2.38)
3.1 **
(1.36)
-11.90***
(2.63)
-3.78***
(0.64)
30.8***
(5.07)
1,042
592
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Table 2.12: Estimating Equation (4) by Inc:reasing 2 Order of the Sum 1 of
Educations of the Importing and Exporting Countries

VARIABLES
Log(Y''Yi' /Yr')

LL'i
Contig'i
CL'i

v= 1
log(M'i')
0.05***
(0.01)
0.004
(0.002)
0.016***
(0.004)
0.000496
(0.00229)

Col'i
Log( dist'i)
Constant
Observations
Number of Groups

-0.006***
(0.002)
0.043***
(0.013)
1,041
540

V= 2
log(M'i')
0.06***
(0.002)
0.006
(0.07)
-0.000**
(0.09)
-0.109**
(0.0516)
-0.25
(0.27)
-0.11 ***
(0.034)
0.95***
(0.28)
1,041
644

V- 3
log(M'i')
0.08***
(0.01)
-0.29
(0.55)
3.358***
(0.66)
0.368
(0.380)
-1.7
(1.56)
-0.06***
(0.220)
0.63
(1.68)
1,040
677

v= 4
log(Miit)
0.10***
(0.003)
0.27
(0.52)
3.93***
(0.69)
-0.495
(0.394)
-0.26
(1.16)
-1.2***
(0.25)
9.76***
(1.9)
1,040
704

1 The
2

ll= 5
log(M'i')
0.11 ***
(0.003)
-2.10
(1.59)
18.26***
(2.33)
2.403*
(1.300)
-10.8***
(2. 70)
-3.4***
(0.56)
28.17***
(4.52)
1,042
651

sum of the total proportiOn of people aged from 15 and above m tertiary schools m the two countnes.
The lower the sum of the proportions of people in tertiary schools, the lower v.

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

Chapter 2. The Implications of HO and IRS Theories in Sub-Saharan African Trade 67

2.8
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Figure 2.1: Value Share of Agricultural and Manufactured Goods in total NOn-Oil
Imports in SSA
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Figure 2.2: Nominal Value of Imports within SSA
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Figure 2.3: The Ratio of within SSA Imports to SSA's Exports towards the Rest of
the World
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Figure 2.4: The Ratio of within SSA Imports to SSA's Imports from the Rest of the
World
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Chapter 3
Property Rights and Economic
Development in Sub-Saharan
African
3.1

Introduction

3.2

Introduction

The importance of institutions in the process of economic development has been
emphasized in the field of development economics, especially after the publication of
the Nobel Laureates North, Douglas's Institutions (1991). North (1991) defines institutions as "humanly devised constraints {formal and informal) that structure political,

economic and social interactions". Institutions mainly affect the economic outcomes
through the economic incentives they alter in citizens to engage in productive activities.
Both, informal and formal constraints (institutions) are shown to have strong effects
on economic performances. For instance, informal institutions related to social capital
such as norms, civic cooperation and trust are shown to be associated with stronger
economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 1993).
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Nevertheless, particular attention has been devoted to the impacts of formal
institutions on economic development. On one hand, some researches focus on the correlation between economic development and political risk factors including government
stability, democratic accountability, bureaucracy, and corruption. There is a consensus that economies prosper in the environments where political institutions constraint
government actions (e.g., Rodrick et al., 2004). Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) show a
strong correlation between corporate governance and political governance. Faria and
Mauro (2009) argue that weak institutions can deteriorate foreign direct investment
(FDI) and consequently the economic progress. Their supporting argument is that
before investing in a country, a foreign fum considers the degree of political tension,
transparency in the corporate sector, and the probability of exposure to corruption.
Shleifer and Vishny (1993); Mauro (1995) warn that corruption lowers economic performance. Works like Barro (1997), Easterly and Ross (1997), and Keefer and Knack,
(2002) show that government stability and government spending are crucial to economic
prosperity.
On the other hand, the emphasis is on property rights institutions. North
(1990) argues that countries where property rights are well defined, secured and enforced by state laws tend to experience higher economic performances. According to
North, secured and enforced private property rights reduce transaction costs in exchange and produce economic incentives, given the expectations that assets will not be
expropriated. In fact, the presence of an efficient judicial system to enforce the third
party interests (contracts) generates investment incentives which lead to competition,
technological innovations and new opportunities. Secured private property rights are
argued to induce more investment in physical and human capital (e.g., Jones, 1981),
whereas, human capital is an important determinant of growth (Romer, 1990).
Although the correlations between property rights and economic outcome have ·
received great attention, different measures of property rights are used in the literature
and the sample countries on which they are examined differ across papers. For instance,
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under the assumption of aJJ overlapping generation, Zak (2002) constructs a growth
model in which property rights are unsecured and costly to enforce. In the model, the
proxy for weak property rights is the access of workers to expropriation technology by
which they can accumulate resources from the capital owners (i.e., violate the property
rights of the owner). Zak {2002) finds that the imperfect protection of property rights
reduces growth and perpetuates poverty. Acemuglu eta!., (2001) uses settler mortality
as a proxy for property right institutions and estimate the impacts of these institutions
on income per capita.
Despite the unanimity about the effects of property rights on economic performance, the magnitude of these effects has not yet been measured, at least for the
exclusive sample of SSA countries. Studying the effects of property rights on the basis
of regional average or by grouping all developing countries in a single sample can be
misleading. Such averages mitigate the wide heterogeneity between countries within
regions and across regions regarding the levels of property rights and the degrees of
their enforcement. For a particular region like SSA, there exist large differences in the
level and the legal enforcement of property rights across the countries. On one extreme,
in SSA, Zimbabwe has the lowest average property rights score 1 (21.66) over the period
from 1995 to 2007. On the other, Botswana has the largest average (70) over the same
period. Different levels of property rights exist in between.
I subdivide SSA countries to identify the magnitude of the effects of property
rights on the total factor productivity (TFP), and to see whether the sizes of the effects
vary or are uniform across income groups and property rights levels. The paper uses a
model in which TFP depends on human capital and different institutional measures2
including property rights. This model allows identifying the effects of property rights on
1

1 use the property rights score database by the ''Heritage Foundation" in this paper. The component "property rights'' of the economic freedo:ffi database refers to private property rights creation
and protection by state enforced laws. Property rights scores are assigned from zero to one hundred,
with higher scores indicating greater existence and enforcement of private property rights.
2
Political risks indicators - variables from the international country risk guide database (ICRG)
and some economic freedom variables - property rights and government spending.
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TFP relative to that of the human capital and the other institutional measures. Twenty
SSA countries are grouped into sub-samples by the property rights benchmark3 and
by income level benchmark. 4 The model estimation is performed on the whole sample
and the sub-samples.
I estimate how different institutions affect the TFP because the TFP has been
pointed out in the literature to explain most of the variation in the development gap
across countries. In fact, a number of papers in the field of development economics
question whether the cross-country differences in per worker income stem from the
differences in factor input or the differences in the TFP (that is the difference in the
efficiency of the use of these factor inputs). To assess whether the factor input or
output accounts the most for income disparity, the development accounting quantifies
the relationship where income is a function of factor input and output: Income

=

F(input, TFP) (Caselli, 2005). The empirical finding suggests at the unanimity that
the total factor productivity accounts for more than 50 percent of the development gap
(Denison, 1962, 1967; King and Levine, 1994, Easterly and Levine, 2001; Caselli 2005).
Given the importance of the TFP in the process of growth, any determinant factor to the
TFP would also be determinant in explaining the development gap or economic growth
differences. Thus, I examine whether property rights and other institutional measures
matter to the change in the TFP. In addition, the total factor productivity includes
the labor productivity. Therefore, it can be used to describe the production function;
whereas, the process of growth depends on the shape of the production function (Barro
3 The average regional property right score from 1995 to 2007 is used as the property rights benchmark based on which the countries are subdivided into two sub-samples: the lower and the upper
benchmark sub-samples. The average regional property rights score from 1995 to 2007 is equal42.92).
Countries with average property right score below this average are classified in the lower benchmark
sub-sample. Those with the average score greater than the benchmark level are grouped in the upper
benchmark sub-sample.
4
The benchmark for the income sub-samples is the average regional income per capita over the
period from 1995 to 2007. This average is 2767 using World Development Data (WDI). Countries
with the average income per capita less than the regional average are grouped in the lower income
sub-group and those with the average RGDP per capita greater than the regional average are classified
in the upper income sub-sample.
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and Sala-i-Martin, 2003).
The choice of the SSA countries for this analysis stems from three main reasons. The first is the wide heterogeneity that exists among SSA countries in respect to
property rights and income. The second reason is the overall lower average property
rights of SSA compared to that of other regions. From 1995 to 2010, the lowest average
regional property rights score was recorded in SSA. The third reason is that SSA lags
in terms of the per capita GDP over time. The average regional GDP per capita and
the average regional property rights scores are distinctly lower in SSA relative to those
of other regions (Appendix Figure, 1, 2). I examine the magnitude of the effects of
property rights on TFP for the sample of 20 SSA countries using data over the period
from 1995 to 2007. Note that 1995 is the year when the first data on property rights
were made available. The countries included in the analysis are those with full data
over the entire period.
The main contribution of this paper is to show the sizes of the effects of property
rights on the TFP across different income groups and different levels of property rights
in SSA. In general, in SSA the change in private property rights has a positive and
strong effect on the TFP. As the total factor productivity is an indicator of economic
growth, this correlation between private property rights and the TFP suggests that
property rights reforms in SSA will enhance the economic growth in the region. The
remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the
history of the emergence of property rights. Section 3 provides the data description
and the model. Section 4 presents the results and their interpretation while section 5
concludes the paper.
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The History and the Point of Divergence in the
Paths of Nations' Development

The evolution of legal property rights and taxation in America and Great Britain
(common law countries) can be traced throughout diverse agreements, declaration, 5
and the philosophical views of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (16321704). For Hobbes, property rights protection must be enforced by a strong sovereign,
while Lock supports that property rights are morally above any government claim.
According to Locke, by applying their labor to things of nature, one could acquire
property rights (John Lock's second treatise on civil government, 1689). Even though
these two philosophical views are diametrically opposed, both authors agreed that
property rights protection must be the objective of any society. The basis for the civic
law can be found in the Napoleonic code adopted during the French revolution of 17891795. This code constitutes the constitutional document for the French and other civic
law countries. The civic law is simply the expansion of state power and is opposed
to custom and common law. However, under both, the common and the civic laws,
property rights are well defined and have been the driving force of economic expansion
in Europe and North America.
The effective existence of property rights gives economic incentives; it is a
fundamental stimulus for citizens to engage in productive activities. In "reflections
on French revolutions", Burke6 wrote the following:

" ... The power of perpetuating

our property in our families is one of the most valuable and 'interesting circumstances
belonging to it, and that which tends the most to the perpetuation of society itself It
makes our weakness subservient to our virtue; it grafts benevolence even upon avarice".
This thought endorses the multiplicative incentive that property rights provide. When
5 The agreement of the people (1649), the English declaration of rights (1689), the Virginia Bill of
Rights (1776), the Declaration of Independence (1776), the Northwest Ordinance (1787), and the U.S.
Constitution (1787).
6 See full text at http:/ jwww.blupete.com/Literature/EssaysjBluePete/PropertyRights.htm.
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one has the legal rights on her asset(s) and knows that these assets can be legally
transferred to her children, she will have incentive to work hard to increase her stocks
of assets, to enjoy it and leave valuable bequest to her future generations. The type of
property rights philosophy that was nourished in the West and North America is what
allowed and continue to ensure economic expansion in these regions.
Even though there were many similarities between earlier societies of Europe
and Africa, the ideology of property rights as a social need was not developed in many
Sub-Saharan African societies. This discrepancy makes a huge difference in the paths of
economic developments between SSA and the other regions. For instance, about more
than two hundred years earlier, some African kingdoms like the kingdom of Aksum7
(the actual Ethiopia) and the kingdom of "Kongo" (the actual Democratic Republic
of Congo), were as much as powerful and rich as the then Great Britain. The Aksum
kingdom especially had its own written language and was able to mint coins and successfully traded with some other regions. During these eras, in the most prosperous
African and European kingdoms the social structures tended to be more absolutist and
based on slavery and serfdom institutions. However, the path of the nations' history
diverged from the point where reforms in social organization took place in Europe and
expanded to North America while in Africa the absolutism continued to reign.
Great Britain's 1640 civil war and the revolution of 1688 drove the demise of
slavery, serfdom and all types of social and political absolutism. The end of absolutism
in Europe, allowed the emergence of property rights, labor market institutions and
people's accession to lands. These new ideologies and mentalities in Europe spilled over
to America. The access to lands and the introduction of property rights institutions
created competition and the incentives to improve the properties and receive the most
fruits of them. 8
Robinson (2010) argues that as slavery, serfdom and absolutism continued in
7

See full history about the Aksum kingdom at http:/ /sharepoint.chiles.leon.kl2.fl.us/mcneilt/Textbook
detailed test at http:/ fwww.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/5352.

8 See
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Africa, no economic incentive for property improvement was created. In contrast, people tend to work less to reduce the amount of their labor that will be expropriated by
the rulers. There were no incentive to stimulate research and discoveries. In this contest Acemoglu (2005) stated that industrialization did not take place where extractive
institutions were established. Citizens have no incentive to engage in creative activities
as they will not enjoy the fruits of their efforts. But, the rulers (expropriators) are less
likely to come up with ideas that generate new technologies. Expropriation9 or lack of
property rights explains why Africans took the opposite development path compared to
Europeans. The history and some investigations on contemporaneous African countries
endorse the fact that property rights are nascent and still weakly secured in different
points of SSA region. For instance, Joireman (2007) points that property rights are not
well defined in SSA and argues that customary laws and the status of women are the
main impediment to property rights enforcement in the region. The lack of strongly
enforced property rights might explain the lower level of incomes across the region.

3.4
3.4.1

The Model and Data Description
Data Description

The analysis in this paper covers a panel of twenty (20) SSA countries10 from
1995 to 2007. The variables 11 used are real GDP, the attainable education as a proxy
9

James Robinson (2(HO) wrote "... to have become more prosperous, the Kongolese would need to
have saved and invested in plows, for example. But this would not have been worthwhile in that any
extra output they produced by using plows and wheels would have been expropriated by the king and his
lords. Many people's property rights were highly unsecured; many moved their villages away from roads
so as to reduce the incidence of plunder." In these circumstances, parliaments, rather than creating
patent laws, were motivated to fight the king and defeat absolutism.
10 Botswana (BWA), Cameroon (CMR), Gabon (GAB), Gambia (GMB), Ghana (GHA), Ivory Cost
(CN), Kenya (KEN), Malawi (MWI), Mali (MLI), Mozambique (MOZ), Namibia (NAM), Niger
(NER), Republic of Congo (COG), Senegal (SEN), Sierrar Leone (SLE), South Africa (ZAF), Tanzania
(TZA), Togo (TGO), Uganda (UGA), Zambia (ZMB), Zimbabwe (ZWE).
11
The tables of the summary statistics and the correlation tables of the variables are given in the
Table section.
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for the human capital or technology, capital stock and different sets of institutional
quality measures. The choice of countries and the data period is driven by the data
availability. Countries included are those with data available on key variables over
the entire period. "Property rights" is the main institutional variable of interest in
this paper. The data on property rights is retrieved from the Heritage Foundation's
economic freedom database. 12 The methodologies used to compute the property rights
scores are complex and reflect property rights creation and enforcement. The details
about the computation can be found at the institution's website.
The variables - government stability, ethnic tension, internal and external conflict, bureaucracy, and corruption are the political risk components and they are retrieved from the international country risk guide "ICRG". The measurement methodologies of these variables can be found on the ICRG's website. All the indexes of the
economic freedom, and the ICRG are compiled using complex methodologies including
statistical models to give sufficient credibility to the data (see the different sources of
these indexes).
I constructed the data on capital stock using the perpetual inventory equation:

K,,

=

I,,+ (1 - o)K,,_ 1 ,

where

K,,

is the current capital stock of country i;

the capital stock of the previous period.

ois the depreciation rate of capital.

K,,_

1

is

I, is the

current real aggregate investment in purchasing power parity and it is computed as
follows: lit= RGDPL,, x POP,, x KI,,, where RGDPL,, is the real income per capita
(Laspeyres), POP,, is the current population of country i and K I,, is the investment
share in total income. The perpetual inventory method is a method of updating data
12 The

Heritage Foundation defines property rights as: an assessment of the ability of individuals
to accumulate private property secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. Property
rights measures the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to
which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private properties will
be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the
judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. The scores of property
rights are ranked from zero to hundred. The more certain the legal protections of properties in a
country, the higher the country's PR score. Similarly, the greater the chances that the country's
government will expropriate properties, the lower score the country's PR score. Intermediate scores
are attributed to countries that fall between two categories.
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that has been widely used in the literature. For instance, Caselli and Feyrer (2007)
used the perpetual inventory equation to update the data on capital stock for countries.
Barro and Lee (2010) uses this methodology to assess the current flow of adult people
added to the existing stock of the educational attainment. The depreciation rate is
set at 6 percent following the literature. The initial capital stock is computed as:

KiO

=

Ii0/(g,1+15), where I;o is the value of investment series in the first year. In general,

the average geometric growth

g,, is computed as the average growth rate between the

first year of data availability and 1970. The reason is before the 1970, capital stocks
were roughly at their steady state (see Solow, 1956). However, for the SSA countries
the first year of data availability is 1950. Thus,

g,, is calculated between 1950 and 1970.

The data on the investment share in total income is taken from the Penn
World Tables (PWT. Version 7). For the data on the human capital, I use the updated
educational attainment data by Barro and Lee (2010), for the population aged 15 and
plus. The data on the real GDP, labor force and population are retrieved from the
World Bank's world development indicators (WDI). All variables are purchasing power
parity (PPP) converted to allow international comparison. The indexes are in level
value.

3.4.2

The Models

The model estimated in this paper correlates is the model where the TFP in a
country is a function of the human capital available, the degree of property rights,
government spending, socio economic conditions, corruption, the extent of internal and
external conflicts, bureaucracy and government stability. This model is estimated to
examine the effects of property rights on the total factor productivity (TFP) across the
property rights groups and income groups of SSA. I first compute the TFP based on
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Coe and Helpman (1995) as follows:

log(A,,) = log(Y;,)- odog(K,,) - (1- a)log(L,,)
where Ait is the total factor productivity,
and

L,, is the labor force.

(3.1)

lit is the output, K,, is the capital stock,

The magnitudes of the coefficients of capital and labor

are found in the literature to be: a

= 1/3 and (1 -a) = 2/3. To assess the effects

of property rights on the TFP, I estimate equation (2) below using the fixed effects
estimation methodologies across the property rights groups and the income groups. I
present the results of this estimation in Table l.

Log(A,,)

=

{ 1 log(Edue;,)

+ 12 log(PR;,) + {slog(GSP;,) + {4GST;, + {5Corit +

/BSEC,,+{7IC,,+i8 EC,,+i9 Bur,,+Eit
where log(A;,) is the log of the total factor productivity, Edue;, P R;,, GSP,,, CST,,,

Corit, SEC,,, IC,,, EC,,, ET;, and Bur,, represent respectively the educational attainment (used as a proxy for the human capital), property rights, government spending,
government stability, corruption, socio-economic condition, internal conflict, external
conflict, ethnic tension, and bureaucracy of country i at time t.
The choice of the institutional variables included is driven by the collinearity
between the variables. Moreover, I include variables upon consideration of the omitted
variables bias and model specification error issues. The question of the consistency
of the parameter estimates is one of the recently debated issues over the results of
empirical analyses- especially when dealing with panel data analysis and the effects of
one variable on another. The inconsistency of parameter estimates can stream from the
existence of simultaneity, endogeneity or omitted variables within the panel (see Stock
and Watson 1993; Baltagi, 2010). The debate over the inconsistency of parameters
has led for instance Coe et a!. (2009) to revise Coe and Helpman (1995) in examining
the effects of research and development (R&D) capital on factor productivity. The
new econometric methodologies recently employed to deal with these issues are the

(2),
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(2009) argue that panel co-integration

increases the consistency of the parameter estimates and provides robust coefficient
to the simultaneity, endogeneity or omitted variables problems. The authors perform
the unit root and co-integration tests of the dependent and independent variables.
The unit root test allows using the first difference of the dependent variable if the null
hypothesis of unit root is not rejected 13 The co-integration test captures whether there
is a long-run stable relationship between the dependent variable and the independent

variable(s) within the panel of countries. Given the possibility of eventual simultaneity,
endogeneity or omitted variables problems within the panel, I perfoqned the unit root
and co-integration tests for the variables used in equation (2) specified above using the
methodologies of Levin et a!. (2002) and Pedroni (2001). Based on the econometric
tests results, I estimate equation 2 using the fixed estimation methodology.

3.5

Results and Interpretation

The investigation on property rights across Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries
reveals the importance of property rights in the economic performance of SSA countries.
Across the sub-groups classified by property rights levels and income levels, property
rights have a positive and statistically significant effect on the total factor productivity
(TFP). Property rights explain at least 0.2 percent of the variation in TFP in SSA.
This effect is economically large. Given the standard deviation of 0.4 in the log of
property rights in SSA, a 1 -standard deviation in the change in property rights leads
to 0.08 proportionate rise or 8 percent increase in the TFP.
Within the classification by property rights levels, the change in property rights
explain 0.3 percent of the variation in the total factor productivity (TFP) under the
upper sub-sample and 0.2 percent for the lower sub-sample, both at 95 percent con13 The

null hypothesis of unit root is rejected if the test statistic is significant (see Levin et al., 2002;
Im et a!. 2003; Coe et a!., 2009).
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fidence. For the classification by incomes, a one percent increase in property rights
is associated with 0.2 percent increase in TFP for both sub-income groups. However,
for the upper income group, this effect is at a 99 percent level of statistical confidence
while for the lower sub- sample the effect is at a 90 percent level of confidence (Table

1).
The estimation results show two important facts about property rights in SSA.
First, there is a difference in the effects of property rights on TFP across the subgroups within each classification type. Secondly, the differences in these effects are not
very large between the sub-groups within each classification type and between the two
classification types. In fact, the estimation result reveals a remarkable pattern of the
effects of property rights on the TFP between the sub-samples within each classification
parameter. Within the classification by income level, the significance of the effect of
property rights on the TFP decreases from the upper sub-group to the lower one,
but the size of the effect remains constant (0.2 percent at 99 percent significance for
the upper sub-sample and 0.2 percent at a 90 percent level of confidence). In the
classification by property rights levels, even though the statistical significance does not
vary, the size of the effect of property rights on the TFP decreases from the upper
sub-sample to the lower sub-sample (0.3 percent at a 95 percent level of confidence in
the upper sub-sample and 0.24 percent at a 95 level of confidence for the lower subsample) (Table 1). There seems to be pronounced effects (in the magnitude or the
statistical significance) of property rights on TFP where property rights are relatively
better and where incomes are relatively higher. In contrast, the effects are either lower
statistically or in magnitude in countries with lower income a.nd countries with lower
levels of property rights (lower sub-samples under both types of classification).
These changes in the effects of property rights on TFP across the lower and the
upper sub-samples highlights two important facts. First, in countries with relatively
higher incomes, property rights have significant impacts on the TFP. From this first
fact, it is ambiguous whether property rights are contributing to the growth of the TFP
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or whether the effects are due to the income level. This fact suggests that relatively
higher income countries have better property rights or countries with better property
rights have better incomes. Whether higher income leads to better property rights or
better property rights provide higher income is hard to untangle and is uncovered in
this paper. It might be the case that both matter. The second fact is that better
defined and secured private property rights have higher impacts on TFP. This second
fact clearly sheds light on the importance of private property rights in the growth
of TFP. Thus, property rights reforms will highly contribute in enhancing economic
growth in SSA.
Despite the differences in the effects of property rights on TFP across countries
within SSA, these di!ferences are not too large; both between the groups within the same
classification and across the classifications. This second remark from the investigation
results points out that SSA there is no big difference in income levels across SSA
countries and the levels of property rights do not vary too much across countries within
this region. This revelation on the non-large difference in income and property rights
in SSA together with the fact property rights matter for the growth of TFP, answer the
question why the SSA countries lag in economic development. Indeed, most of the SSA
countries have lower incomes (15 countries out of 20 countries in the data sample have
their average income per capita below the regional average.) and weakly defined and
enforced private property rights (about half of the countries have an average property
rights below the regional average. The averages of the others slightly surpasses the
regional average.)
Even though not too large, the variation in the effects of property rights on the
TFP across the sub-income and property rights groups in SSA are an indication that
property rights matters for growth. Countries with relatively higher property rights
experience higher effects on the growth of the TFP. Given the finding of previous
empirical works emphasizing that TFP explains most of the variations in the cross
country differences in income per worker, the strong and positive correlation between
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property rights and TFP demonstrates that property rights Property rights reforms will
enhance growth in SSA. Most importantly, these reforms are needed in most countries
in the region.
The overall results of this paper highlight that property rights are important determinants in the process of economic development in SSA. The access to enforced private property rights will accelerate the economic growth of SSA countries. In practice,
the effect of property rights enforcement on growth has been experienced in Botswana.
Figure 3 shows the correlation between the property right scores in 2005 and the average investment per capita over the period from 2005 to 2009 in some SSA countries.
In this correlation ·graph, Botswana lies at the upper right. In fact, Botswana has
experienced a substantially high growth relative to other SSA countries in recent years.
Although different factors might have contributed to this success, many economists believe that the private property rights protection policy of Botswana is the main driver
of its high growth. Devarajan, Easterly and PaCk (2003) write that "the government of

Botswana clearly convened it would protect private property rights". The paper states
further that the political stability in addition to the relative low corruption and press
freedom made Botswana attractive for investment. In short, private property rights
enforcement matters in stimulating investment and hence the economic growth.
These conclusions are robust with respect to civil liberties. The impacts of the
civil rights on the total factor productivity are similar to those of property rights. I
use the civil right from the "freedom in the world" database to check the robustness
of the effects of property rights on the TFP. Civil Liberties are measured on a one-toseven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest.
This implies that the higher the score the least degree of civil liberties. Thus, if better
civil liberties improve the TFP, one would expect negative and statistically significant
coefficients for this variable in the regression. I subdivided the country sample into
lower civil liberties sub-group (civil liberties scores of 1, 2, and 3) and an upper civil
liberty sub-group (scores of 4, 5, 6, and 7). As shown in Appendix Table 4, the effects
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of civil liberties on the TFP are large and statistically significant in both sub-samples.
The increase in the scores lowers TFP. It is remarkable that the coefficient is lager in
the sub-group of the lower civil liberties. This indicates that TFP in these countries will
dramatically decline in these countries for a given percentage drop in the civil liberties.
While, in the upper sub-group, the same proportional change in the civil liberties will
have less adverse effect.
Civil liberties and property rights are components of individuals' rights. These
rights when available and enforced by state laws, they give incentive to citizens to
engage in productive activities and to contribute to their countries' economic growth.
The results on the effects of civil liberties on the TFP confirm the importance of private
property rights in the process of economic growth.

3.6

Conclusion

This paper mainly shows that the lack of property rights is an impediment to the
economic growth of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Improving property rights
would significantly increase the total factor productivity (TFP) within the SSA region
in general. Even though some differences exist, the countries in SSA do not differ to

a large extent in their incomes and property rights levels. Moreover, the income and
property rights levels are lower in the region. Given the finding of this paper, that
property rights are important determinants of TFP growth and the finding of previous
works that TFP accounts for a large proportion of the development gap across countries,
this paper recommends private property rights reforms in SSA. The creation of private
property rights and their enforcement by clear state laws would contribute to SSA's
economic growth.
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Regression Tables

Table 3.1: The Effects of Property Rights on the Total Factor Productivity
P R 1 Groups
Inc? Groups
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Whole

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

VAR.

log(TFP,,)

log(TFP,,)

log(TFP,,)

log(TFP,,)

log(TFPit)

log(Edue;,)

0.8***
(0.24)
0.22***
(0.07)
0.02
(0.19)
-0.18***
(0.03)
-0.07*
(0.04)
0.05***
(0.02)
0.05*
(0.03)
0.03
(0.02)
0.02
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.3
(1.13)

0.8**
(0.34)
0.30**
(0.13)
0.13
(0.23)
-0.12**
(0.04)
0.003
(0.06)
0.08***
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.04)
0.04*
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.005
(0.01)
-0.9
(1.64)

1.0***
(0.33)
0.25**
(0.09)
-0.24
(0.35)
C0.28***
(0.05)
-0.02
(0.06)
0.02
(0.03)
0.11***
(0.04)
-0.003
(0.03)
0.04*
(0.02)
0.06***
(0.02)
1.5
(1.74)

1.4**
(0.55)
0.20***
(0.07)
0.16
(0.21)
-0.16***
(0.05)
0.06
(0.08)
-0.03
(0.03)
0.002
(0.04)
-0.001
(0.04)
0.07**
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.02)
-L4
(1.5)

1.0***
(0.32)
0.23*
(0.11)
-0.18
(0.28)
-0.20***
(0.04)
-0.09
(0.05)
0.08***
(0.02)
0.06
(0.04)
0.03
(0.02)
0.005
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
1.12
(1.5)

246
0.20
20

138
0.15
11

108
0.41
9

62
0.40
5

184
0.21
15

log(PRit)
log(GSP,,)
ET;,
Burit

SEC,,
Cor,,
EC,,
!Cit
CST;,
Const.

Obs.
R-sq.
Groups
1

.

Property Rights Groupsj 2 fucome Groups

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: The Whole Sample
Var.
Obs Mean Stendard Deviation Min Max
2.5
0.5
0.9
4.5
Log(TFPu) 258
8.5
0.8
7.1 10.3
log(Y,tf L,,) 260
0.6
1.4
-0.1 2.2
log(Educit) 260
3.7
0.4
4.2
log( FR.;,)
247
2.3
0.2
4.4
3.8
4.6
log(GSPit) 247
5.7
1.0
8.3
3.6
log(K,tf Lit) 258
1.8
260
8.9
3.3
11.1
GST;,
260
4.1
1.4
1.5
8.0
SEC,,
1.0
260
3.6
1.5
5.0
ETit
9.0
1.6
12.0
260
1.3
!Cit
1.4
EC,,
260 10.2
4.6 12.0
2.4
0.9
0.0
5.0
260
corit
0.9
260
1.4
0.0
3.5
Burit
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Table 3.3: Correlation Table: The Whole Sample
Var.
Log(TFPit)
log(Y;,)
log(Educ,,)
log(P R,,)
log(GSPit)
log(Kit/ Lit)
GSTit
SECit
ETit
I Cit

Log(TFPit)

log(Yit)

1.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
-0.3
0.2
0.3
0.0
0.0

1.0
0.5
0.2
-0.5
0.8
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.2

log(Educit)

log(P R,,)

log(GSPit)

log(Kit/ Lit)

CST;,

SECit

ET;,

IC,,

g
.g
~

"'

1.0
0.3
-0.4
0.5
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.1

""'~

1.0
-0.3
0.2
-0.1
0.4
0.2
0.2

>§

1.0
-0.4
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.4

~

~

1.0
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3

tJ

1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

~

1.0
0.2
0.3

&!"

1.0
0.5

~

0..

1.0

~
§

§.
(")

~
iS

~

>§
tl
§

~

s·

if

~
~

~

§
__,

00
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Table 3.4: Civil Liberty and TFP
Higher Civil Liberty Lower Civil Liberty
VARIABLES
Log(TFP;,)
Log(TFPit)
0.8***
0.3
log(Educ;,)
(0.22)
(0.42)
-0.62**
-0.25*
log(CL},)
(0.29)
(0.14)
-0.01 *
-0.002
log(GSP;,)
(0.005)
(0.003)
-0.01
-0.1
Burit
(0.06)
(0.07)
0.02
0.01
GST;,
(0.02)
(0.01)
-0.1 ***
-0.06
ET;,
(0.03)
(0.06)
0.4**
0.24
Regulatoryit
(0.14)
{0.16)
-0.04
0.06
PST[,
(0.08)
(0.11)
-0.104*
-0.593***
CCorf,
(0.09)
(0.17)
1.9***
3.3***
Constant
(0.52)
(1.018)
Observations
94
140
0.40
0.22
R-squared
Number of countryid
12
15
1

Civil Liberty;

2

Political Stability;

3

Control of Corruption

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 3.1: Average Regional Real GDP per Capita
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